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PREFACE

The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional Convention will need historical, legal and comparative information
Recognizing this need, the
about the Montana Constitution.
1971 Legislative Assembly created the Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to assemble and prepare
This series of
essential information for the Convention.
memorandums by the Commission is in fulfillment of that res-

ponsibility.
This memorandum on legislative reapportionment was written
by Ellis Waldron, a professor of political science at the
University of Montana and a Commission member. The Commission
has authorized publication of the report as approved by the
Research Subcommittee on Local Government consisting of
Commission members Clyde L. Hawks, St. Xavier chairman;
Charles A. Bovey Great Falls; Jack E. Brenner, Grant;
Eugene H. Mahoney Thompson Falls, and Professor Waldron,
The memorandum includes historical background and
Missoula.
present trends concerning the question of constitutional
treatment of legislative reapportionment.
,

,

,

This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the people of
Montana and their delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional
Convention.

ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN

This memorandum is a supplement to The
Legislature Constitutional Convention
Study No. 12, prepared by the Montana
Constitutional Convention Commission.
,
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LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

SUMMARY:

REAPPORTIONMENT AGENCY AND STANDARDS

Apportionment of legislative representation is a perennial
problem involving fundamental elements of representative
The "Great Compromise" in the Philadelphia
government.
Convention of 1787 reconciled conflicting views about
apportionment of representation in the national legislature
and cleared the way for the delegates to write the constitution we now revere.
The Northwest Ordinance of the same year required "proportionate representation of the people" in the legislatures
of the Old West, and congressional legislation for the
territories extended this requirement to the territorial
government of Montana. For a quarter-century, both chambers
of the Montana territorial legislative assembly v/ere roughly
apportioned to population. But a one-senator-per-county
requirement was written into the Montana Constitution of
Montana was apparently the first state since some of
1889.
the original thirteen to base representation in one legislative
chamber on counties, without regard to their population.
Representation on this "little federal" analogy persisted in
Montana and was embraced in a few other states during the
The result was growing
first half of the twentieth century.
disproportion between constituency population and representation in the legislature; disproportions that had been
moderate in the 1890s became considerable by the midtwentieth century. Malapportionment became considerable in
the house of representatives as well, despite the contrary
intent of the 1889 Constitution, because legislative policy
gave each county one representative regardless of population.
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court required all houses
of state legislatures to be apportioned to constituency
populations, stating that any other mode of representation
denied people equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
Montana's 1889 constitutional
the Fourteenth Amendment.
provisions for the senate and long-standing statutory provisions for the house fell before judicial challenge in
1965; the disproportion of representation to population in
both houses was so great and so apparent that the federal
court simply took judicial notice of the "invidious disIt passed the ball back to the 1965
crimination" involved.
Legislature, which was unable to agree upon a reapportionment,
and then finished the job after legislative adjournment.
The 1967 Legislature adopted the judicial reapportionment as
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Statute law. Meanwhile, the 1965 Montana Legislature had
proposed a constitutional amendment, ratified in 1966,
that removed archaic and unconstitutional provisions relating
to apportionment from the constitution.
By 197 the general standard of population equality to be
achieved among legislative districts, although not precisely
defined by the federal courts, was understood to cast doubt
upon variances of more than 10 percent among districts.
In the 1971 Montana Legislature, the senate and house reapportionment committees went through the regular session
without agreement upon any reapportionment plan, and plans
given serious consideration in both committees were either
patently unconstitutional or open to grave constitutional
questions. A plan finally adopted during the first special
session broke no county boundaries but had population variances of 37 percent in the senate and 23 percent in the house
between largest and smallest constituencies. A federal district
court promptly declared the plan unconstitutional because of
these variances and invited the legislature to try again.
In a second special session, the legislature adopted a plan
that split five counties, with maximum population variances
of 10.95 percent between the largest and smallest districts.

This plan also was challenged in the federal court that retained jurisdiction from the first action; with election of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention imminent, the
court sustained the reapportionment for election of delegates
to the Convention, and further considered its validity for
legislative elections; ultimately the reapportionment was
sustained for ensuing legislative elections, on the somewhat
novel ground that the average population variance among
The court refused
districts was less than 3 percent.
to adopt either of two other reapportionment plans that had
total population variances of less than 4 percent on the
ground that the legislature had made a good-faith effort to
achieve equality while preserving as many county boundaries
as possible, and tha-t the maximum variances were "tolerable."
The court said plaintiffs had failed to prove that the large
multi-member district in Yellowstone County amounted to a
political gerrymander.

Montana's experience with judicial agency to backstop the
legislature in reapportionment has been more typical than
exceptional, but less complicated than the experience of
many states where both state and federal courts have sometimes
been involved with successive sessions of the legislature.
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This may have been avoided in Montana by the willingness of
the federal court in 1965 to assume the task of reapportionment.
But there is widespread sense that judicial reapportionment is not the most desirable pattern, and that
there may be better ways to handle this perennial problem.

The judicial reapportionment of 1965 reversed a fundamental
From
aspect of legislative representation in Montana.
1889 to 1965, single-member districts had been the prevailing
mode of representation except for small multi-member house
The federal
districts in a few of the most populous counties.
court, in 1965, sacrificed this prevailing pattern in order
to preserve county boundaries for districts; less than half
of the counties were single-county districts.
The 1967
Legislature, having managed election from the new-style
districts, ratified the court's decision into statute.
The
1971 Legislature sought without success to keep legislative
districts within population variances of 10 percent without
breaking county boundaries, but evidently still considered
the integrity of county boundaries to be more important
than the resulting pattern of multi-member representation.
Single-member districting disappeared entirely from the
house of representatives and only ten of fifty senators would
be elected from single-member districts in the 1970s.
Two
of these single-member districts were single-county districts.

Most states still entrust the reapportionment function to the
legislature, but some states have experimented for more than
a century with a non-legislative reapportionment agency.
Such experiments multiplied dramatically during the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. The earlier experiments, like that of Ohio, made reapportionment an executive
but essentially non-discretionary function to carry out
rigorous constitutional specifications for districting and
These arrangements did not function effectively
apportionment.
when they functioned at all during the 1960s, in part because
the constitutional standards to be applied were not compatible
with "one-man, one-vote" equality of constituency populations.

—

Starting with Missouri in 1945, a growing number of states
have developed specialized bipartisan reapportionment agencies
either to backstop or to supplant the legislature as the
reapportioning agency. By 1971, the constitutions of more
than a third of the states had provided for some nonlegislative reapportioning agency, either to backstop the
legislature after its failure, or simply to perform the task
instead of the legislature. The popularity of such arrangements has been particularly apparent among constitutions whose
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legislative articles have been redrafted as part of general
constitutional revision in recent years. Among more than a
dozen such constitutional drafts since 1955, only two left
the traditional legislative arrangement for reapportionment
undisturbed.
The special bipartisan reapportionment commissions of
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Hawaii, and those proposed for
Maryland and New York, each varying in detail from the others,
were developed in efforts to improve upon somewhat earlier
models in Missouri, Michigan and New Jersey. All of them
afford interesting grist for constitutional innovation, if it
appears that the traditional legislative agency, now so commonly
shared with the courts, has not been wholly satisfactory.

Among interesting recent innovations are the proposals of the
1968 Maryland draft constitution, adopted in a modified form
by special constitutional amendment in 1970, that require a
non-legislative agency to initiate reapportionment and submit
its plan to the legislature; the legislature has a limited
amount of time to revise or adopt the plan or to enact its
own alternative; if the legislature fails to act by the deadline, the non-legislative reapportionment becomes law.
Thus
at the end of the legislative session which has a responsibility
to reapportion, there is a reapportionment even if the legislature fails the task.
In Maryland as in other states, any plan
adopted by any reapportioning agency, whether legislative or
non-legislative, is subject to judicial review for conformity
to state constitutional standards and to the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection standard of the national Constitution.
It is too early to assess the relative success of legislatures
and of special reapportionment agencies in the 1970s.
A
summary of 1971 reapportionments available at year's end reported that twenty-nine states had completed the task in some
fashion but that judicial challenge had been made in sixteen
states.
Seven of the twenty-nine states had managed reapportionments with population variances of less than 1 percent.
Judicial challenge of Montana's second 1971 legislative
reapportionment had failed in a federal district court but the
variances in the plan were marginally large and appeal to the
United States Supreme Court was still under consideration in
December 1971.

The rigorous constitutional standards for reapportionment in
nineteenth century constitutions have proven to be unworkable
by "one-man, one-vote" standards and they have been repealed,
as in Montana, or remain in the state charter as deadwood
awaiting the axe of general constitutional revision.

;-•%,
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The modern state constitutions commonly determine the size
of the legislative chambers, either stating a fixed number
of members, a range of size or a maximum to be observed by
They commonly declare whether
the apportioning agency.
districts are to be single-member or multi-member or (at
They
least by implication) a mixture of the two forms.
counsel the observance of compactness, contiguity and equality
of population in the districts and, sometimes, observance of
existing subdivision boundaries as district boundaries.
Some qualify these standards by "as possible" or "as
practicable" or "substantial" or "with due regard," but such
qualifiers may add little to the force of the word modified,
while furnishing additional ground for litigation over the
discretion exercised by the reapportioning agency.
The reapportionment provisions of the Montana Constitution,
as amended in 1966, seem compatible with contemporary imperatives of reapportionment. The provision [Art. VI, Sec.
2 (3)] that contemplates return to one-senator-per-county
representation seems unlikely to be implemented even if it
should sometime become permissible; it speaks as a voice
from the nineteenth century, plaintive, probably archaic, but
The language of the provision for comessentially harmless.
bination of counties [Art. VI, Sec. 3] may be open to interpretation that it permits combination only of whole counties,
The standards of
and conceivably could cause difficulty.
contiguity and compactness in the same section seems unexceptionable.
The principal constitutional issues involving reapportionment
are likely to be whether the constitution should develop a
non-legislative agency to backstop or to supplant the
legislature in the reapportionment function and whether the
constitution, rather than the legislature, should determine
the kinds of districts from which legislators are to be elected.

-5-
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PREFACE:

A WORD ABOUT TERMS

Late in the last century, from about the year I960,
Americans struggled for "equality of representation"
by periodic or decennial redistricting and reapportionment of their legislative assemblies to what they
called "one-man, one-vote" standards.
All of the key words used in that struggle had either
The only popular label develfour or five syllables.
oped by men-in-the-media to identify what was going
on was itself a compound of four one-syllable words
that were even less descriptive than the polysyllables
used by the politicians, legalists and academics to
communicate with each other.
A citizen in 1971 might have wondered whether these
ponderous incantations were the mutterings of some
priesthood conspiring to keep him bewildered. The
simple truth, seen in the long evolution of language
forms, was that the problem was new and that shortword symbols had not yet developed for matters not
yet entirely understood.

— Thomas

Aquarius, from Polls, Pols
and Words (Mars: Multican & Lipschitz,
2071 A.D.

Thus might a 21st-century historian of the language look back
at our efforts to communicate about a fundamental aspect of
The term "reapportionment" has come to
our political system.
identify two separable but related aspects of a periodic
process for determining representation in representative
Strictly speaking, the term "districting" refers
assemblies.
to the process that establishes the boundaries of election
districts from which legislators are elected, while the term
"apportionment" refers to the process that assigns the number
Political
of legislators to be elected from each district.
decisions of a fundamental sort are involved, at some stage,
in both processes, but the particular combinations of process
determine how frequently, and at what points, these decisions
must be made.
In the historic Montana state senate, both districting and
apportionment were "automatic" or "self-executing:" each county
received an apportionment of one and only one senator and no
apportioning agency was required; this simply perpetuated a
profoundly important political decision made in the Constitutional
Convention of 1889.

-6-
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Modern one-man, one- vote requirements have tended to require
active decision-making about both districting and apportionment
With single-member districts,
at each periodic reapportionment.
redefinition of district boundaries to create districts of
approximately equal population becomes the focal point of
political pressure, while apportionment of one seat to each
district is "automatic"--the policy involved in the decision
having been made earlier, perhaps by constitutional provision.
With multi-member districts, both districting and apportionment
If districts may be
may have recurring political implications.
redefined from time to time by new combinations or by subdivisions
of counties, the political process is renewed with each such
If apportionment involves assignment of one or
redefinition.
many legislative seats to each district, depending upon its
population, political decision is involved with each periodic
Thus in modern times, periodic political process
assignment.
has been involved in both districting and apportionment of
both houses of the Montana Legislature.
TWO CENTURIES OF LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT
In a system of representative government, decision about who
will "represent" whom, or what, in the legislature has constitutional dimensions that were recognized in colonial
charters and the earliest state constitutions of the 1770s.
Modern state constitutions generally address the matter either
in the legislative article or in a separate article such as
Article VI of the 1889 Montana Constitution, titled "Apportionment and Representation."

Centuries-long recognition of the fundamental importance of
decisions about representation does not mean that consensus
Political thought
has been reached about its implications.
is far from agreement about what the essential act of representation in fact involves, quite apart from questions about
what it should involve in any particular political system.-^
Divergent views about the nature and norms of representation
are part of the debate about the nature of democracy itself.
Pessimistic observers make lack of agreement a starting point
for their criticism of democratic political systems; others
more optimistically inclined suggest that lack of agreement
about the nature and functions of representation is a symptom
of growth and of expanding horizons of human experience and
values
In antiquity, rulers regarded themselves as representatives of
those they ruled, even as modern dictators make essentially similar claims that they rule because they know best what is good

—
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In medieval Europe, notions of group or corpofor the rest.
rative representation emerged, and in both England and on the
continent, members of pre-modern parliaments were spokesmen of
classes or estates the nobility, the clergy and eventually
the burgers or bourgeoisie from the commercial market towns.
At first these spokesmen of their estates assented to taxation
of wealth in the form of land and of commerce in exchange for
having some say about what should be done with the money. Only
gradually did parliaments gain law-making functions that are
considered the essence of their modern function; this happened
long after advisory judicial and fiscal functions had been
divested to specialized judicial and administrative bodies.

—

In general during the medieval and early modern period, individuals had been regarded as aggregated for representation as
members of a class or of a place; similar notions of class or
occupational representation have persisted in modern Europe in
the representation through corporations in Fascist Italy and
in factory Soviets (assemblies) in the Soviet Union.
Vestiges
of corporative or non-territorial representation persisted in
the United Kingdom until 194 8 in the election of certain members
of the House of Commons from non-territorial university constituencies.
The House of Lords had from the first comprised
representatives of the nobility and clergy, selected without
regard to a territorial place or district.^

As early as 16 35, some attention was paid to population size
of the assembly constituencies in Massachusetts Colony, and
the Rhode Island charter recognized "comparative numbers" in the
towns "almost from the start."
But summarizing colonial experience with representation. Luce concludes
:

Nowhere did representation bear any uniform relation
to the number of electors
Here and there the factor
of size had been crudely recognized.
It took the
travail of the birth of a nation to make men think they
had rights of men, as individual men, and that each was
entitled to a share in government equal to that of his
neighbor
[This idea] came nearer than most
political ideas to being an invention, a discovery.^
.

....

Yet there had been suggestions of such notions a century earlier
in John Locke's tremendously influential Second Treatise of
Civil Government (1690)
In his discussion (Chapter XIII) of
the legislative branch, Locke was troubled by the rotten borough
phenomenon by which "the bare name of a town
where scarce
so much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a
shepherd is to be found, send[s] as many representatives to
the grand assembly of lawmakers as a whole county numerous in
people and powerful in riches." But his legislature was "the
.

.

.

.

LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

one supreme power" and correction of this deficiency presented
There was apparently no notion that the
practical probleins
sovereign legislature itself could be expected to rectify "the
disorders which succession of time have insensibly as well as
inevitably introduced" by rise of "new corporations, and therewith new representatives" while others "cease to have a right,
and be [come] too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which
before had it."^
.

'^

Locke proposed a solution more akin to modern notions than
much of the intervening historical experience.
The executive,
exercising prerogative power to implement the principle
Salus populi suprema lex (the people's welfare is the highest
law)
should convoke the legislature according to "the numbers
of members in all places, that have a right to be distinctly
represented ... in proportion to the assistance which it
afford to the public ... it being the interest as well as
intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative
."
Such executive intervention would permit the people
.
.
to "choose their representatives upon just and undeniably
equal measures, suitable to the original frame of government."
Such action "cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative,
but to have restored the old and true one."'^ This seems to be
a reasonable summary of notions spread across two lengthy pages
of rather abstract and archaic prose, and the modern observer
may be pardoned for a certain excitement in finding the essential
elements of the modern reapportionment problem in a discourse
three centuries old: a rigid structure of representation progressively distorted from original intent by the shifting of
populations, unable to correct its own structural distortion;
and an outside agency, the executive, intervening to restore
the intended bases of representation.
It will be noted below
that the American states generally ignored Locke's notion, and
vested responsibility for periodic rectification of the disorders
wrought by time and movement of peoples in the legislature itself.
,

.

Certainly the notion that individuals might represent aggregations
of other specific individuals found roots and took substance in
the heightened sense of individuality that has characterized
modern western society. The emergence of social contract notions
of political authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
contemporary with American colonial experience, reflected the
impact of this individualism; the political system came to be
regarded as a matter of agreements among individuals about their
needs for government and about their expectations of those who
would be entrusted with political authority.
The fact that some of the colonial assemblies had based representation on the numiDer of "ratable polls" (taxable persons) in
territorial enclaves may have informed arguments of colonists

9-

LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

that taxation by Parliament could be justified only if the
colonies had direct representation in that body. Luce suggests
that Patrick Henry may have been the first to propose apportionment of representatives in strict ratio to population, during
discussions in the 1774 Continental Congress. Pennsylvania
first gave systematic implementation to the idea in the apportionment provision of its 1776 Constitution, to be implemented
by a census in 1778 and every seven years thereafter.
The early
state constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine
also recognized population as a basis for apportioning legislative representation, and the idea was extended to the new states
of the "old west" by requirement of the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 that "the inhabitants of the said territory shall always
be entitled to the benefits
of a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature."'
.

.

.

In England, representation closely apportioned to population
came somewhat later.
The English Reform Act of 1832 for the
first time reorganized membership in the House of Commons to
represent people within fixed and mutually exclusive territorial subdivisions of the United Kingdom. 8 There have been
four major realignments of representation in the House of
Commons since 18 32, each more closely approaching the notion
that each member, elected from a single-member district, should
represent roughly comparable numbers of constituents.
In the
mid-nineteenth century, population disparities among singlemember districts were of the magnitude of 110 to 1, or even
150 to 1.
Such disparities have been reduced to the magnitude
of two-to-one or three-to-one in the most recent redistricting
activities.

It may be noted in passing that the task of redistricting the
United Kingdom for parliamentary elections is performed by
permanent boundary commissions functioning as administrative
agencies to implement general standards defined by Parliament.
The somewhat-depoliticized Speaker of the House of Commons
serves on each of the boundary commissions; other members of
Commons are barred from membership.
Robert Dixon emphasizes
that the English boundary commissions consider "local ties"-whatever these may mean and that the narrow margins of population variance currently demanded in American reapportionment
practice would seem peculiar in the United Kingdom.
In short,
the British have come far from the 150 to 1 population variance
ratios of 1868, and have experimented in interesting fashion
with periodic review by administrative agency. Yet a rigid
"one man-one vote" policy of elevating mathematics above community would be contrary to deeply imbedded English conceptions
of representation and to recent practice.^

—
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The eighteenth and nineteenth century American experience with
districting and apportionment of state legislatures has not been
definitively analyzed. The work of Robert Luce, dean of an
earlier generation of legislative scholars, is anecdotal, not
Three widely cited modern
very systematic and seriously dated.
discussions manage to convey divergent impressions of the earlier
experience.
In December, 1962, at the threshold of the reapportionment
revolution, the quasi-public Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations issued a report. Apportionment of State
"The original constitutions of
Legislatures that declared:
36 of our States provided that representation in both houses of
the state legislatures would be based completely, or predomiThe influential nature of this finding
nantly, on population."
is indicated by its citation in the 1964 Supreme Court reapportionment cases that required both houses of state legislatures
Under this somewhat
to be apportioned closely to population. '-"
unexpected rule Montana's constitutional provisions for equal
senate representation of counties without regard to their population soon were held to be unconstitutional under the equal
protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. ^-^
,

The 19 62 Advisory Commission report measured eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century practice against the considerable population
disparities that existed in most state legislatures in the
It empha1960s, on the eve of the reapportionment revolution.
sized two points: that earlier state legislatures, whatever their
formal constitutional provisions, represented population, however
counted, more equitably than did many twentieth-century legislatures, and that organization of state legislatures on the
"little federal analogy" so familiar to Montanans was exceptional,
rather than common practice, among the states.
The 1962 ACIR report and the 1965 treatise of Robert McKay, dean
The
of the New York University law school. Reapportionment:
Law and Politics of Equal Representation stressed the influence
of the requirement in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in holding
nineteenth-century legislatures to apportionment on the basis of
population. McKay stated: "Not until more than a hundred years
after the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 did states
such as California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania, responding to new pressures, abandon the equalpopulation principle in one or both houses. "^2
,

McKay identified the 18 89 Montana Constitution as heralding a
"new trend." Contrary to practice in its territorial legislature
which represented population at least roughly in both chambers,
and contrary to the selection of Convention delegates themselves
in proportion to population, the 1889 xMontana Constitutional
Convention
-11-
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worked out a different formula, retaining population
as the basis of representation in the lower house but
allotting one senator to each of the sixteen counties
The change was prompted by the
in the upper house.
rapid grov/th of population between 18 80 and 18 89,
after the discovery of copper, and particularly the
concentration of that population in three counties in
the western part of the territory.
As a result, the
fear was expressed, as it was soon to be expressed in
other parts of the country, that a concentrated majority
of the voters was not to be trusted with legislative
power.

Thereafter, the same phenomenon recurred in a number
of the already-established states
Montana, then,
was in 1889 the immediate harbinger of the future.
Within seven years of the taking of the 189 census
Delaware and New York changed their state constitutions
After the census of 1900 Ohio
guaranteed
each of its 88 counties at least one representative
13
without regard to population.

....

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

An over-simple summary of twentieth-century experience with
reapportionment would suggest that states whose constitutions
required periodic reapportionment to population equality
standards simply "ignored the state constitutional command for
periodic reapportionment"!^ while legislatures in states like
Montana, whose constitutional provisions served to deepen
malapportionment with each succeeding decade, observed their
constitutional obligations rather faithfully.!^

The third and most comprehensive review of reapportionment
experience, by Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation;
Reapportionment in Law and Politics (1968)
reviewed the pre1964 reapportionment experience against rigorous contemporary
one-man, one-vote standards and emphasized that the earlier
standards of population equality were considerably less demanding,
But in general this study by a professor at the National Law
Center, George Washington University, affirms the notion that
there was a flight from population standards of the nineteenth
century during the first half of the twentieth century. Dixon
(at page 77) questions the detailed validity of the 1962 ACIR
Report but scarcely dents its overall findings. McKay's characterization of nineteenth-century apportionments as dominated
by "a population-apportionment principle" was "supported by
part of the eager empirical data available [but] rebutted by
other parts." Yet the main theme of the earlier studies is
accepted.
While none of the territorial legislatures created
under the Northwest Ordinance would have met "one-man-one-vote
standards of the mid-1960s
none of the population disparities approached the ranges of the more deviant states on the
,

....
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eve of Baker v. Carr; rather, they were more similar to the
ranges which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in 19 64
for Colorado (upper house, 3.6 to 1; lower house, 1.7 to l)."^^
Of Montana, Dixon states:
Montana, for example, came into the Union in 1889
with guarantee of county equality in the senate. The
provision was motivated mostly by fear that otherwise
both houses would be controlled by three counties
containing the copper and gold boom towns of Butte,
Anaconda and Helena. By the eve of Baker v. Carr the
policy of equal representation in the state senates
of fixed geographic units, with insignificant modifications based on population, was part of the formal
apportionment formula in seventeen states, of which
ten were Western or Midwestern states. ^^

The record of legislative districting and reapportionment in
Montana has been sketched elesewhere and will not be repeated
in detail here.^^ The Reapportionment Revolution of the mid-1960s
made much of this local record little more relevant for current
consideration than the experience of other states.

Reflecting the pattern of the Northwest Ordinance noted earlier.
Congress in 1867 required the bicameral territorial legislative
assembly of Montana to reflect population of the counties that
served as legislative districts to both chambers. ^^ The draft
Constitution of 1884 contemplated continuance of representation
according to population in both chambers:

Article IV, Section 4 (in part)
It shall be the duty
of the first Legislative Assembly to divide the State
into Senatorial and Representative districts, but there
shall be at least one Senator from each county
:

....

Article IV, Section 46: The Legislative Assembly, at
its first session held under this Constitution, shall
provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants
of the State, and as often thereafter as in the opinion
of the Legislative Assembly such enumeration shall be
necessary, and shall revise and adjust the apportionment for Senators and Representatives on the basis of
such enumeration according to the ratio to be fixed
by law.

Article IV, Section 48: The Legislative Assembly shall
not increase the Senate and House of Representatives to
a number greater, in the aggregate, than one hundred,
prior to the year, A.D. 1900, and in case of such
increase, the ratio of Senators to Representatives
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provided for in Section Four [21-to-45] of this Article shall be preserved as nearly as practicable.
The 1889 Constitutional Convention departed from this historic
pattern of representation based on population, and the departure
provoked one of the major controversies of that convention. The
1889 congressional enabling act for the northwest states had
omitted stipulations requiring representation apportioned to
population, the provisions that had held representation in the
Montana territorial legislature fairly close to the population
norm of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
Delegates from sparsely
populated eastern agricultural counties evoked the "little
federal analogy" to justify representation of counties equally
in the senate, without regard to their population.
As noted by
both McKay and Dixon, they were determined to offset the
entrenched political power of the older and more populous western
mining centers; the matter was not unrelated, besides, to the
rather spectacular rise of Republican Party strength during
the previous decade.
Western-county delegates attacked the
validity of the "little federal analogy" with vigor but no
success; Missoula County delegates joined eastern-county delegates
to recommend that each county should be represented by one and
only one senator.
Parts of that decision were embedded in
several provisions of the constitution and this fact in itself
probably reflects the bitterness of the struggle over the bases
of political power in the new state legislature. ^0
The Montana senate created in 1889 represented counties equally;
each would have one and only one senator. ^1 As new counties
were carved out of existing counties during the next four
decades, the original senate of sixteen members became a body
of fifty-six.
The population disparity among counties in the
early 1890s was in the magnitude of about 11.5-to-l; by 1962
the disparity had increased to 88-to-l between Yellowstone
County and Petroleum County, each represented by one senator.
Senators representing less than 17 percent of the state's population could have mustered a majority of votes in the 196 3
legislature.

The Montana House of Representatives was to be reapportioned
to population twice each decade, on the basis of census
enumerations and "according to ratios to be fixed by law. "22
During the first two decades, disparities among populations
represented by house members were held within the magnitude of
about two-to-one.
Representatives of at least 45 percent of
the state population, however aggregated, would have been required
to cast a majority vote in the house or representatives during
these early decades.
In the original 1889 constitutional apportionment, population
equality was achieved in part by creation of several joint or
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"floterial" seats in which two counties shared a representative
who was the sole representative of the less populous county.
The 189 5 legislative reapportionment terminated seats jointly
held by two counties, and initiated the policy that eventually
caused serious malapportionment to develop in the house of
representatives; each county would receive at least one representative regardless of population.
From time to time the total
number of seats was readjusted by changing the apportionment
ratio that fixed the number of seats for each county.
The steady
if unspectacular growth of the state's population, combined with
the creation of new counties, increased the house from its
original membership of 55 in 1890, to 72 in 1905, to 95 in 1915,
to 10 8 in 19 21.
The apportionment ratio of one representative
for each 4,800 population or major fraction, set in 1911, was
changed to 1 per 6,000 in 1921; 1 per 7,000 in 1941, and 1 per
8,500 in 1961, evidently with the intent of keeping membership
less than 100, the maximum comfortable seating capacity of the
house chamber.
House membership ranged from 100 to 10 2 between
1921 and 1941; 90 during the 1940s; and 94 from 1953 to 1965,
when judicial reapportionment increased the size to 10 4.
The
1971 reapportionment by which Constitutional Convention delegates
were elected, set the size of the house at 100.

Malapportionment of the Montana house of representatives reached
significant proportions only toward the end of the "county-busting
era" after 1910.
As the number of counties doubled between 1910
and 1925, some of them for the first time lacked sufficient
population to entitle them to a first representative.
The 1921
reapportionment set a ratio of one representative for each 6,000
population or major fraction (one more than half, or 3,001). For
the first time, in 1921, several counties lacked the 3,001 population that would have entitled them to a first representative;
they got one anyway, under continuance of the 189 5 statutory
policy that each county should have at least one representative
regardless of population.
In succeeding decades that policy
progressively distorted representation of the house of representatives.
The number of counties whose population was less
than a major fraction of the apportionment ratio increased from
four in 19 20 to eight in 1930; to fourteen in 1940; to sixteen
in 1950, and to nineteen in 1961.
In the apportionment of 1961,
upset by the federal court in 1965, representatives of only 36.6
percent of the state's population could have mustered a majority
of votes in the house of representatives, and the disparity
between smallest and largest representation ratios had grown
from about l-to-5.2 in 1930, to l-to-14 in 1961.
That is, the
largest house constituency was fourteen times larger than the
smallest constituency--one representative for the 675 persons
found in Petroleum County by the 1961 census.
In siommary, a
statutory policy set in 1895, only questionably constitutional
-15-
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under terms of the 1889 Montana Constitution, had led
the house of representatives to become grossly malapportioned
to population by the eve of the reapportionment revolution.
Both
houses of Montana's legislative assembly were more malapportioned
to population than several of those found by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1964 to be unconstitutional denials of equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 3

When the Montana legislative assembly met in January, 1965,
Montana was one of but seven states in which no judicial
challenge to state legislative apportionments had been brought
in the wake of the 19 64 reapportionment cases.
The governor
invited the legislature to reapportion the house of representatives,
to adjust the congressional districts and to propose a constitutional amendment that eventually would permit statutory
reapportionment of the senate. The next day, Mrs. Phoebe
Herweg of Butte asked the federal district court to declare
both houses of the state legislature malapportioned in violation
of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection of the
laws.
The court took judicial notice of "invidious discrimination" in the election of members of both houses and invited
the legislature to correct the matter.
Nearly a dozen reapportionment bills were introduced, but none was acceptable to
the legislators; their only effective response to the judicial
challenge was proposal of a constitutional amendment that
cleared the way for future statutory reapportionments to oneman, one-vote standards.
The amendment, ratified in 19 66,
removed archaic apportionment and districting provisions of the
original constitution, deleted the prohibition against subdivision
of counties to permit establishment of single-member districts,
removed constitutional provisions barring equitable apportionment of the senate and deleted an unworkable provision for
filling legislative vacancies.
The amendment also anticipated
a time when constitutional interpretation or amendment would
permit restoration of a senate based upon one senator per
county.
The federal district court stepped back into the litigation
after the legislature adjourned, and decreed one of the earliest direct judicial reapportionments of a state legislature.
It created a senate of fifty-five members and a house of 104,
creating districts of whole counties or combinations of whole
counties, and substantially altered the historic basis of
representation primarily from single-member districts. Where
the senate had always been single-member, one per county,
eleven of the more populous counties now elected from two to
six senators each; 35 of the 55 senators now would be elected
from multi-member districts.
Where only 38 of the 94 representatives in the 1961 legislative reapportionment had been
elected from multi-member districts, 9 3 of the 104 representatives now would be elected from multi-member districts.
The
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shift to multi-member representation resulted in part, of
course, from assignment of more legislative seats to the most
populous counties, but it was also the product of assigning
two representatives to a single-senator district; this occurred
in seventeen districts. ^^

Later in 1965, the federal court readjusted the boundary between
the two congressional districts for the first time since its
establishment in 1917, and required reapportionment of aldermanic
districts in Butte to one-man, one-vote standards. 25 jn 1967
the legislative assembly adopted the judicial apportionment
without change, 26 and this plan remained in effect through the
November, 1970 election.
In 1971 the legislature enacted a new apportionment in the first
special session27 that was held invalid by a federal court for
population variances of as much as 37 percent between the largest
and smallest constituencies 28 j^ second reapportionment plan,
also challenged in federal court, was sustained for election of
the Constitutional Convention, 29 and later for subsequent legislative elections ^'^ This 19 71 reapportionment went even farther
than the 1965-1967 reapportionment to employ multiple-county
and multi-member districts.
Only five single counties comprised
entire districts: Cascade, Flathead, Lake, Silver Bow and
Ravalli; all other counties were either combined as whole counties
or had portions combined with other counties. Only ten senators
among the 150 legislators would be elected from single-member
districts. There were no single-member house districts because
representation from the twenty-three districts was simply doubled
for house representation.
The distribution by number of
legislators per district is shown in Table 1.
.

.

It is axiomatic that partisan interests are deeply involved in
legislative reapportionment, and to the extent this is true,
the remarkable record of party division in Montana during reapportionment years might suggest a particular difficulty for
legislative address to the problem.
In eight of ten reapportionment sessions following a federal census (1891 to 1971) or a
judicial invitation to reapportion (1965), party control was
divided between the legislative chambers (six times: 1891, 1911,
1941, 1961, 1965 and 1971) or between the governor and the
legislature (twice: 1931 and 1951).
Only in 1901 and 1921 did

the same party control both legislative chambers and the governorship.
Stated somewhat differently, in each of the last
six sessions charged with a specific obligation to reapportion
(1931 through 1971) the disposition of party forces was such
that a gross partisan gerrymander working to the advantage of
one party could have been blocked either by one chamber or by
a veto.

But the partisan interest is neither simple to identify nor
readily assessed, because each party has bases of strength in
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1

DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATORS PER DISTRICT IN MONTANA
19 71 REAPPORTIONMENT
NUMBER OF

NUMBER OF DISTRICTS
Senate
House

IlLMBEI^S

Single-member

10

2-member

6

3-member

4

4 -member

1

6

6-member

2

4

—
—

8-member
1 2-member

Source:

19 71 Laws of Monta na,

10

1
2

2nd Extra Session, Ch,

more than one region of the state, and among both city and
rural constituencies depending upon the region.
The record of
party division might help explain the disinclination of legislators publicly to exacerbate the partisan considerations, but
there may be other factors as well.
Interparty coalitions
of local partisan interest may be involved.

CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT
Apportionment provisions of the 1787 national Constitution
borrowed from contemporary state constitutional practice. Article 1, Section 2, clause 3 contained an initial apportionment
of house seats to each of the thirteen states in rough proportion
to their presumed populations; guaranteed each state a first
representative; required a census to be conducted decennially,
and required that "representatives and direct taxes shall be
apportioned among several states
according to their
respective numbers" (but without express requirement that
Congress reapportion after each census). ^^
.

.

.

The number of representatives in Congress originally was limited
to not more than one for each 30,000 population--a size limitation
that still prevails but which rapidly became meaningless with
growth of the nation's population. After the 1790 census,
-18-
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the House of Representatives increased from the original 65
members to 105 one member for each 33,000 population.
Each
decade Congress reapportioned, increasing the size of the House
eventually to 435 after the 1910 census, when it was agreed
that there should be no further increase.
This meant that after
the 19 20 census. Congress faced the classic modern reapportionment dilemma: without increasing the size of the House, eleven
states had to lose representation to allow eight others to gain
the seats to which their 1920 population entitled them.
So,
for the first time, Congress failed to reapportion on schedule;
the matter was finally resolved by 1929 legislation providing
for what amounted to "automatic" reapportionment by executive
action.
After each census, the Bureau of the Census would
compute the representation of each state by a formula for
resolving fractional claims to seats (the method of "equal
proportions" was chosen in 1941)
the President then would
report the results to Congress, which would relay them to the
states.
A contemporary observer has remarked of the process:

—

;

With the apportionment function now largely the
responsibility of executive authorities. Congress
no longer is able to ignore the reapportionment
obligation
Congress itself recently has
done no more than consider questions of expanding
House size. -^2

....

Starting in 1842, Congress required election of representatives
from single-member districts and from time to time has required
other standards such as compactness, contiguity and equality
of population; the actual districting function is left to the
states, which have left it generally to their legislatures
subject, since Wesberry v. Sanders 33 in 1964, to judicial review
for observance of increasingly rigorous one-man, one-vote standards of population equality within each state.
THE RETiPPORTIONING AGENCY IN THE STATES

Charters of the American colonies, at least from the latter half
of the seventeenth century, commonly provided for apportionment
of elected representatives to the lower house of the colonial
assembly.
Similar provisions were included in the earliest
state constitutions, regulating allocation of representation
in the state legislature. ^^

From the outset, most state constitutions provided for some
regular, periodic adjustment of representation to keep it at
least roughly proportionate to population in at least one chamber
of the legislature, but phasing of this operation to the
-19-
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decennial federal census came to prevail only gradually. Several
state constitutions drafted before the 1787 national charter
adopted the seven-year cycle of English parliamentary elections;
other states required reapportionment as frequently as every
session (Iowa Constitution of 1846, for the house of representatives) or as infrequently as two decades (North Carolina and
Maryland).
Many northwestern states, from Wisconsin and Minnesota westward, provided for a second census to be taken between
decennial federal censuses; legislative reapportionment was
to occur after both the federal and state censuses.
Montana
adopted but never observed this pattern; Article VI, Section 2
provided for a census in 1895 and every ten years thereafter,
with ensuing reapportionment (which would have been for two
of the five legislative elections each decade) after both the
state and federal censuses.
This provision was deleted by the
reapportionment amendment adopted in 1966.
Quite generally, the states have come to reapportion decennially
after the federal census. 35 This appears currently to meet
Fourteenth Amendment requirements of equal protection as interpreted in the federal courts, since the basis for determining
the populations to be equalized is the decennial census (with
occasional exceptions for a basis in registered voters). There
is current discussion of a federal census every five years; the
effect of this upon reapportionment practice can only be surmised.
Since federal standards generally must be met where applicable,
a modern state constitutional provision on this point might
simply relate the frequency of reapportionment to the required
standard of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. Any
provision that conflicted with that possibly evolving standard
would in due course be held invalid anyway, as were some Montana
constitutional provisions for reapportionment after the 19 64
Supreme Court reapportionment cases.

Except in a few states where districting and apportionment
arrangements were frozen in the constitution from the outset
in 1776, the legislature was generally charged with responsibility
to implement periodic reapportionments that would follow the
initial constitutional allocation of legislative seats. ^6 The
literature of reapportionment, including Alfred Z. Reed's exhaustive study, is curiously silent about the eighteenth-century
reasons for assignment of this function to the legislature. To
have the legislature in effect determine the conditions of its
own composition was scarcely consistent with concern for checks
and balances among the several branches of government.
We have
noted that a century earlier, John Locke had not supposed the
legislature would correct inequities or distortions of its
representative base, and thought that the executive should restore
the legislative branch to its intended bases of representation
from time to time.37

-20-
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Assignment of the reapportionment function to the legislature
might have resulted from lack of experience with the difficulties
involved in the process, or it may have been the product of
distrust of the executive. Reed noted that prejudice against
the colonial governors was expressed by enumeration of a limited
number of executive powers in the early state constitutions,
leaving "a broad field of administrative activity for which no
constitutional organ was provided. "38 ^g found the first century
of legislative experience to be somewhat bitter; state systems
of districting and apportionment had two "especial weaknesses"
their complexity and the manner in which they discriminated
against effective representation of urban centers 39 There was
a "very simply explanation
for the chaos and, from the
point of view of the dominant city-dweller, the unfairness, of
the prevailing legislature structure:"
.

.

.

.

Provisions affecting the composition of the Legislature
are what they are, because they have been drafted by
members of already constructed Legislatures.
That the Legislature cannot be entrusted to determine
the rules of its own being, we have always assumed
as axiomatic.
And the wisdom of laying down constitutional rules of apportionment, and the beneficial
working of these rules in the main, are clear
.
[contrasted with distribution of seats in the Imperial
German Reichstag]
The reason why, however, we
are in some danger of losing our comparative advantage
is that Constitutional Conventions have been constructed
on the model of one or both houses of the Legislature,
and that the existing system of districts has thus been
in a sense self-perpetuating. ^0
.

.

.

.

.

These words, written more than sixty years ago, may explain the
fruits of the eighteenth-century decision to vest responsibility
for reapportionment in the legislature itself, but they do
not explain the basis for that initial decision.
There were a few early exceptions to legislative responsibility
for periodic reapportionment.
The initial failure of several
state constitutions to make any provision for a reapportioning
agency was associated with rigorous constitutional provisions
that apparently were supposed to be self -executing; this seems
to have been the case in Maryland from 1837 to 1851.
In Massachusetts, from 1836 to 1857, the governor and council were
charged with largely ministerial application of stringent
constitutional regulations for reapportionment. '*! The Ohio
Constitution of 1851 put the reapportionment function in an
ex officio board of the governor, the auditor and the secretary
of state.'' 2 Their function apparently was conceived to be
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largely ministerial or non-discretionary; the assignment of
house and senate seats among districts was defined in the
constitution according to population ratios whose application
was specified in the apportionment article. This arrangement
followed fifty years of legislative reapportionment that has
been described as "a politician's dream and a voter's nightmare. " 43
Observing requirements of the Northwest Ordinance, the 1802 Ohio
Constitution had required representation in both houses of the
Ohio Legislature "according to the number of white male inhabitants. "44
In 1853 the Ohio Supreme Court described legislative
apportionment under these provisions as "a most humiliating
experience
with [legislative] scenes of anarchy and confusion [that] undoubtedly determined the people to deprive that
body of [the function] absolutely "45
.

.

.

.

The Ohio Constitutional Convention decision in 1851 to establish
an apportionment board reflected difficulties with gerrymandering,
and with determination of an appropriate agency for subdivision
of counties into single-member house districts.
Summarizing
more than a century of Ohio experience with the board, Jaffy
concluded:

The apportionment system designed in 1851 operated
satisfactorily and did not engender many disputes.
The Apportionment Board performed its ministerial
duties each decade, and thus Ohio has been one of
the few states which has reapportioned regularly
without a single default. Litigation of Article XI
was minimal; only three suits were instituted before
1961.46

Ohio's modern difficulties with reapportionment were the product
of the 190 3 "Hannah Amendment" that made every county a house
district and guaranteed it at least one representative. As in
Montana, such provisions created gross inequalities of representation in relation to county population in ensuing decades,
and in 196 4 a U.S. Supreme Court decision required Ohio to
reapportion to standards declared in the 19 64 reapportionment
cases 4 7
.

Ohio's experiment with non-legislative reapportionment was not
widely emulated during the century that preceded the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s.
In 1954, constitutions of
forty-two states still made the legislature the apportioning
agency, and in thirty-nine of these, it was the sole agency. 4 8
In California, South Dakota and Texas, ex officio commissions
were designated to reapportion if the legislature failed to
accomplish the task, and Florida empowered the governor to call
the legislature into special session to complete the task.
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Three other states--Arizona, Arkansas and Missouri--had joined
Ohio in placing the reapportionment function in a non-legislative
agency
By contrast in 1971, after a decade of experience with one-man,
one-vote requirements for reapportionment, the constitutions
of at least nineteen states involved some non- legislative agency
These non-legislative or extrain the apportionment process.
legislative reapportionment agencies will be examined in two
general groups--those that initiate the process outside the
legislature, and those that involve a non-legislative agency
only after legislative failure to complete the task.

Cour ts Backstop the Legislatures
Tne most obvious fact about reapportionment in the past decade
is the massive involvement of both federal and state courts.
Prior to 1962, state court involvement was not uncommon in some
states, but feueral courts were reluctant to intervene in state
reapportionment responsibilities, even where congressional
districting was the issue. The principal utterance of the United
State Supreme Court had been Colegrove v. Green (1946) in which
a singularly ambiguous set of opinions tried to explain the
grounds for a decision not to require Illinois realignment of
congressional districts whose boundaries dated from 1901.
In 1962 all doubts were put to rest about the availability of
federal courts to compel state legislative reapportionment.
In Baker v. Carr seven members of the United States Supreme
Court agreed that a Tennessee federal district court had jurisdiction in equity to entertain a class action by Tennessee voters
claiming that apportionment of the state legislature deprived
them of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection of the laws. The
Supreme Court directed the federal district court in Tennessee
to hear the case.^^ The Baker decision prompted initiation
of a large number of reapportionment cases in federal courts of
various states, and in 1964 the Supreme Court held not only
that congressional district populations must be equalized, -''but also that population equalization must prevail in elections
to all houses of state legislatures ^2
,

.

Just as Justices Black and Rutledge had anticipated and Justices
Frankfurter and iiarlan had feared in 1946, courts in the 1960s
declarea apportionments to be invalid; enjoined further elections unuer tnem; referred the matter back to legislatures for
corrective action, and sometimes assumed the responsibility to
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"affirmatively re-map" when legislatures failed to respond
This happened in
Oklahoma and Montana. Courts even ordered at-large election
of a state legislature in Illinois (Frankfurter's ultimate
horror in the Colegrov e opinion had been at-large election
of congressmen) pending satisfactory statutory or constitutional action.
in a manner satisfactory to the court.

There was widespread concern about judicial involvement in
matters so elementally political, usually by the interests
disadvantaged in the new reapportionment processes, including
legislators who thought the job should be theirs even when
Some of the judges themselves
they could not accomplish it.
apologized for their intervention. Senator Dirksen of
Illinois made another valiant try to get a constitutional
amendment that would give his name immortality. But by 1970,
courts had become irretrievably involved as backstop agencies
for legislative reapportionment.

Robert Dixon, a leading legal scholar with important reservations about judicial reapportionment, found an example of
judicial involvement that he thought might serve as a model
for states that did not develop some alternative to legislaIn Illinois after legislative
tive-judicial reapportionment.
failure, involvement of the state supreme court (which wanted
and una panel of law-school judges to get the job done)
successful use of computers, a highly respected chief judge
of a federal district court engaged both political parties
in frank bipartisan negotiation through pretrial conference,
narrowing their areas of disagreement and negotiating their
acceptance of judicial choice to settle differences ^^
,

.

By the end of the decade, federal courts had been drawn
into reapportionment litigation in thirty-nine states
(state courts also were involved in eighteen of these
states), and state courts alone were involved in nine
other states.
In only two states (Kentucky and South
Dakota) neither state nor federal courts were drawn into
reapportionment actions during the decade.
Had their

reapportionments been challenged, however, both probably
would have been found invalid by equal protection standards
that had evolved late in the decade.^'*
In at least
fourteen states, including Montana, some sort of constitutional revision brought basic law into conformity with
the new "one-man, one-vote" standards of the Wesberry
and Reynolds cases.
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Some state constitutions expressly involve the state's highest
court to backstop the legislature at a specified juncture, or
For example, if
in response to a suit to compel performance.
the Maine legislature fails to reapportion, the supreme court
make the apportionment."^^ The
"shall, within 60 days
proposed Rhode Island Constitution of 1968 would have given
the state supreme court six months to reapportion the state
after failure of the legislative session following a federal
or state census to accomplish the task. 56
.

.

.

Constitutions of many states now expressly give a kind of
ultimate backstop role to the highest state court by provisions for original jurisdiction of suits to compel or to
review reapportionment performance by whatever agency the
constitution specifies for the task. These provisions are
particularly common in constitutions drafted within the
past decade, including those of Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois
and Michigan. 5^
Some constitutions specify time limits for the judicial involvement, either to expedite the process where judicial
involvement is an indispensable element to get the job done,58
or to limit the time within which a voter may challenge a
reapportionment--in effect, to put the matter to rest until
the next periodic reapportionment is required. ^5
Some state constitutions seek to give "exclusive" jurisdiction to state courts in reapportionment matters but this
probably aoes not preempt jurisdiction of a federal court
disposed to review a state apportionment for conformity
to equal protection standards. 60
,

The Council of State Governments reported in December, 1971
that twenty-nine states had redistricted their state legislatures since the 1970 census, but that sixteen of these
reapportionments had been challenged in the courts, and in
at least six states, including Montana, courts had invalidated
Congressional districting had
at least one reapportionment.
been accomplished in twenty states, including Montana. ^^

Backstop Reapportionment Agencies
Several states involve their elected state officials to
backstop the legislature if it fails to reapportion. Florida
requires the governor to call the legislature back into a
special session restricted to reapportionment; more commonly,
a number of elected state officials, sometimes sitting with
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designated legislative leaders, are constituted as a special
ex officio board to reapportion after legislative failure.
Such arrangements must be classified as partisan in approach,
because there is no assurance of bipartisan balance among
a designated group of elected state officials.
Because of
their statewide constituencies, they also may be predisposed
to favor interests that hold a statewide plurality among
electors--notably the large cities in some states. Several
states, including most recently Illinois, have constituted
special bipartisan commissions to backstop the legislature
in order to maintain balanced consideration of partisan
political interests.
,

Dixon, writing late in the 1960s, brushed aside "extensive
elaboration" of the experience with backstop arrangements
in most of these states "because none of the provisions
played a major role in the reapportionment revolution of
the
sixties '." ^2 This does not diminish their possible intrinsic interest for constitution-writers of the 1970s, because many of the states expected the backstop arrangements,
like the entire reapportionment function, to be performed only
in the year or so immediately following a census.
By implication or by express statement [South Dakota Const. Art. Ill,
Sec. 5] , function of the backstop agency later in the decade
could have been challenged as unconstitutional.
'

Exconples of backstop agencies:

Florida .
If the Floriua legislature adjourns tlie session
in the second year after the decennial census without naving
reapportioned, the governor is to call a special session
limiteu to reapportionment business "and it shall be the
manuatory uuty of tiie legislature to adopt a joint resolution
of apportionment."
Should this fail, the state's attorney
general is required to petition the state supreme court to
make the apportionment; the supreme court is given sixty days
from the filing of this petition to complete the job.^^
Oregon
If the legislature fails to reapportion in the
session following the decennial federal census, or if the
state supreme court determines that the legislative reapportionment does not comply with constitutional requirements,
the secretary of state is required by the constitution to
draft a reapportionment plan for approval by the state supreme
court.
In 1961 the state supreme court invalidated a legislative reapportionment of that year and directed the secretary
of state to draft a new reapportionment, which was ordered
into effect by the court.
In 1967 the legislature adjusted
congressional district boundaries ^^
.

.
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If the legislature fails to reapportion in
Califo rnia.
the session following a feaeral dc^cennial census, the constithe
tution designates the lieutenant governor (as chairman)
attorney general, the state controller, the secretary of
state and the state superintendent of public instruction to
complete a reapportionment.^^ In 1965, under strict orders
of tne state supreme court either to reapportion to its judicially defined standards of equal representation or to accept
a court-devised plan, the California legislature managed a
,

satisfactory reapportionment.""
If the first regular legislative session
Oklahoma.
following the decennial federal census fails to reapportion,
tne attorney general, the secretary of state and the state
treasurer are designated ex officio to reapportion by majority
vote within sixty days."'

If the legislature adjourns the first
North Dakota
session after a decennial federal census without completing
a reapportionment of the house of representatives, the chief
justice of the supreme court, the attorney general, the secretary of state and the majority and minority leaders of the
house of representatives are designated an ex officio apportioning board to complete the task.^^ In 1961 the commission
reapportioned the house after legislative failure and a
federal court sustained this plan pending further legislative
But eventually a three- judge federal district court
action.
reapportioned both chambers in 196 5.^^
.

If the legislature following a federal deSouth Dakota
cennial census adjourns without completing a reapportionment,
the constitution designates the governor, superintendent of
public instruction, presiding judge of the supreme court,
attorney general and secretary of state as an apportioning
board to complete the task.'^ The legislature reapportioned
in 1961 and again in 1965; the latter reapportionment was not
challengeu in the courts but probably would not have been
sustained under equal protection standards that came to prevail in the latter 1960s. ''I
.

If the legislature fails to complete a reapporTexas.
tionment in the session following a decennial federal census,
tne lieutenant governor, attorney general, controller of
public accounts, commissioner of the general land office and
speaker of the house of representatives are constituted an
ex officio legislative redistricting board to complete the
reapportionment within ninety days of the legislative adjournment. 72

New Mexic o. The rejected draft constitution of 1969 would
have had the governor appoint a five-member reapportionment
commission to act if the legislature failed to reapportion in
-27-
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the first regular session after the decennial federal census.
The commission would have been required to submit a plan to
the state supreme court within ninety days "for approval as
to legal sufficiency and corapliance with this article."
The
court-approved commission plan would become law.'^

Connecticut
The 1965 Connecticut Constitution established
an elaborate set of arrangements
including a backstop commission to complete reapportionment in the event of legislative failure.
The initial responsibility of the legislature
to reapportion after each census must be discharged by an
exceptional two- thirds vote of each house.
If (when?) this
fails, an eight-member bipartisan commission constituted by
legislative leaders next has responsibility to prepare a reapportionment; the house speaker and minority leaders, and
the senate president pro tem and minority leader each designate two members whom the governor then appoints to the
reapportionment commission. If six of these eight commissioners
cannot agree upon a reapportionment, the house speaker and
house minority leader each designate a superior court judge
to serve on a board; these judges select "an elector" as
third member of the board.
This board, by a majority of two
members, is charged with developing a plan which becomes the
.

—

—

reapportionment

.

'

This complex reapportionment program was developed after the
two major parties managed a successful legislative reapportionment by direct negotiation in the mid-1960s. But the
Constitutional Convention that drafted the program had itself
been required by the federal court that "led, pushed, and
hemmed in" the whole process. The Connecticut plan almost
seems designed to move through all of its projected stages;
this may have occasioned an evaluation that "Connecticut
provided no 'method' for export to other states. "^5

Illinois
In 1954, an Illinois constitutional amendment
constituted a bipartisan apportionment commission to function
if the legislature failed to reapportion the house of representatives. The governor would appoint five members from
each of the two principal parties from nominees submitted by
the state party central committees.
If the commission failed
to agree upon a reapportionment, the house would be elected
at large.
That entire scenario unfolded after 1960, prior
to federal court intervention mentioned earlier.
Of the
earlier Illinois experience, Dixon commented that creation
of the commission relieved the legislature of ultimate responsibility, while providing no tie-breaking vote in case of
commission deadlock--which happened; he thought at-large election seemed more appropriate as a sanction to compel legislative
action than as a constituted recourse in case of commission
.

failure. ^^
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The Illinois Constitution of 1970 yjrovided for a differently
constituted backstop apportionment commission.
If the legislature fails to redistrict the state by June 30 of the year
after the decennial census an eigiit-member commission is
the speaker and minority leader of the house,
constitutea:
ana the president and minority leader of the senate each
designates a member of his own chamber and another person who
The commission, acting
is not a legislator to the commission.
by majority of five, is expected to submit a redistricting
plan by August 10; if it fails, the secretary of state draws
the name of one of two persons designated by the state supreme
court to serve as a ninth tie-breaking commissioner, and the
commission then has until October 5 to submit a plan by fivemember majority vote. The constitution is silent about what
happens if the commission fails at that stage; but the state
supreme court is given "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over actions [initiated by the attorney general] concerning
redistricting the house and Senate. "^^
,

Non-legislative Agencies to Initiate Reapportionment
Two elements in particular have characterized some of the more
recent constitutional arrangements for legislative reapportionment:
Tne legislature lias been substantially or entirely
(1)
supplanted as the agency with reapportionment responsibilities;

Special bipartisan reapportioiiment agencies have been
(2)
constituted to allow for responsible expression of the partisan interests involved.
The two elements appear in differing combinations.
Alaska,
Arkansas and Arizona took the function away from the legislature, but left it in partisan executive hands.
Missouri,
Michigan, New Jersey, Hawaii and Pennsylvania developed
special bipartisan commissions in various forms. The draft
constitutions of New York and Maryland, rejected for reasons
other than their apportionment prooosals, contained features
aeserviny particular comment at a later point.

Non-legislative reapportionment aqencies include:
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution long has required the
secretary of state, every fourth year, to certify the number of
.
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house members to be chosen from each county, according to elaborate constitutional standards for districting and apportionment.
In 1954, an American Political Science Association
study of state legislatures characterized the arrangement in
Arizona as "the nearest approach to an automatic system" and
thought it merited consideration in other states because "the
bottleneck of the apportioning agent is broken by removing
legislative control entirely, and in effect
resting the
apportioning function with the electors themselves" because
the periodic reapportionments were to be based for each county
upon the vote cast for governor in the previous election. ^^
.

.

.

But experience in the 1960s indicates that the "automatic"
provisions resting upon rigid constitutional prescriptions
do not work when federal constitutional norms of equal protection are to be effectuated.
Reapportionment in Arizona
has been almost continuously before a federal district court
that reapportioned the state in 1965, and litigation was still
before the United States Supreme Court in 1971.^9

Alaska . The 1956 Alaska Constitution made reapportionment
an executive responsibility closely following the National
Municipal League's Model State Constitution [Art. IV, Sec.
The governor's responsibility to reapportion mem(4.04).]
bership in both houses arises "immediately following" each
decennial federal census. For performance of this function
the constitution requires establishment of an advisory apportionment board; the governor appoints its five members,
including one from each of four constitutionally designated
regions, "without regard to political affiliations;" but
"none
may be public employees or officials." This board
.
must prepare and submit a plan of districting and reapportionment to the governor within ninety days. The governor within
.

.

another ninety days must proclaim a redistricting and reapportionment: if he revises the board's plan he must explain his
changes °^
.

Arkansas
The governor is chairman of a mixed "board of
apportionment" that includes the elected attorney general
and secretary of state along with two non-legislators designated by each house. This board "shall divide the state into
house and [single-member] senate districts" unless the state
supreme court revises the plan for "any arbitrary action or
abuse of discretion by the board. "^^
.

The three-member Arkansas board reapportioned both houses
of the legislature after a federal court in 1965 found them
to be unconstitutionally maiapportioned; controversy continued into 1969 in efforts to compel adoption of singlemember districting. ^2
-30-
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The 1945 Missouri Constitution was apparently
Missouri.
the first to establish a special bipartisan reapportionment
commission of ten members to reapportion the senate. ^3 The
governor named five commissioners each from lists of nominees
submitted by the state party central committees . °'* It has
been pointed out that this is not strictly bioartisan because
of the opportunity given the governor in a "one and one-half
party state" to select "nominal" partisans from the minority
Republican Party. ^^

After federal court intervention the commission reapportioned
the senate in 1965; after voters rejected a legislative reapportionment of the house in that year, a 1956 constitutional
amendment created a second twenty-member bipartisan commission
This commission is designated by
for house reapportionment.
the governor from nominees submitted by congressional district
committees of the major parties ^^ This body successfully
reapportioned the house in March 1966 without partisan dead.

lock.

There is a backstop arrangement to operate if either Missouri
the supreme
reapportionment commission should deadlock:
court can appoint the six supreme court commissioners (three
Lack of deadlock in
from each party) to complete the task.
the primary commissions obviated need to call this backstop
agency into operation during the 1960s, but there seems little
reason to suppose that it would be less prone to deadlock than
the larger commissions 87
.

The 196 3 Michigan Constitution established an
Michigan
eight-member bipartisan legislative apportionment commission
to which the state organizations of the two major parties
each designate four members (one from each of four regions
the eight commissioners elect
defined in the constitution)
one of their members to serve as chairman and have 180 days
after census data is available to district and apportion both
If no five-member majority can agree upon a plan,
chambers.
individual commissioners can submit plans to the state supreme
court which then orders adoption of the plan that "complies
most accurately with the constitutional requirements "°°
.

;

.

Late in 1963 the Michigan commission tried to reapportion the
state, but no plan could muster a five-member majority and
four different plans were submitted to the state supreme court
None of these conformed to requirements of
early in 1954.
the 1964 reapportionment cases anct the state supreme court
oraered tiie commission to try again; again it deadlocked and
eventually the court selected a plan submitted by two Democratic members that most nearly met one-man, one-vote standaras.°^
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In Michigan, a state with strongly bipartisan politics,
deadlock of an evenly balanced bipartisan commission with
no tie-breaking vote seemed predictable. Moreover, the
constitution made no provision for vital working data
generated by the commission to be transmitted to the court
for its backstop performance.
The constitutional requirement that the court simply adopt one of tlie commissionerdeveloped plans, with no juuicial authority to modify it,
in effect guarantees judicial adoption of a partisan reapportionment plan.^^

New Jersey

.

A 1966 constitutional amendment established

a bipartisan commission to reapportion the New Jersey legis-

lature.
The state chairman of eacii major political party
appoints five members to the commission, giving "due consideration" to geographical distribution of the membership, by
November 15 of the federal census year. By February 1 of
the year after the census, the commission by majority vote
is to develop a reapportionment.
If it deadlocks, the chief
justice of tiie supreme court names an eleventh tie-breaking
member of the commission, wiiich then has another month to
complete its task.^-^

The first commission "as expected" deadlocked in 1966 and
an eleventh member was designated.
The eleven-member commission then developed a reapportionment that was challenged
immediately in the courts, and tlie state supreme court made
several changes in the commission plan in further litigation
that extended into 1969.^2 Dixon described changes made by
the court in 19 6 7 as "nit-picking" and thought the New Jersey
commission plan had "strong claims to near-model bipartisan
apportionment" because the tie-breaking eleventh member
assured achievement of a plan constructed on a basis of sound
and adequate political information.
He thought the plan could
be further improved by requiring judicial challenges of
commission reapportionments to demonstrate i" invidious political or racial effect" rather than simply to "shave a few
population percentage points in one corner of the state."
Moreover, the New Jersey plan "entirely precludes legislative action" on reapportionment. ^3

Hawaii
The 1968 Hawaii Constitution provided for a bipartisan nine-member "legislative reapportionment commission"
to reapportion the state every eight years.
The majority
leaders of each legislative chamber designate two commissioners each; a member of tiie minority party in each chamber
designates two commissioners; the eight commissioners, by a
vote of at least six, elect a ninth member to serve as commission chairman. On each island, an advisory council is created
to advise the commission "for matters affecting its island unit
.
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commission, by six-member majority, submits a reapportionment plan to the state elections officer, effective upon

Tiie

its publication.^'*
In 1968, a constitutional amendment estabPennsylvania .
lisiied a five-member legislative apportionment commission to

reapportion in the year following the decennial federal
census. The majority and minority leaders of each legislative
chamber "or deputies appointed by each of them" comprise
four members, who then select a fifth to serve as chairman;
if they cannot agree upon a fifth member, that member is
designated by a majority of the state supreme court justices.
Acting by majority vote, the commissioners file a "preliminary"
reapportionment plan with the state elections officer within
ninety days of the availability of census data.
If no exceptions to this plan are filed within thirty days, it becomes
law; but the state supreme court can return the plan to the
commission, with instructions for revision.
If no majority
of the commission can agree upon a plan, the state supreme
court serves as a backstop; it may proceed "on its own
motion to reapportion the commonwealth. " ^^
New York
The 1967 New York araft constitution proposed
establisliment of a five-member redistricting commission in
the same general pattern as that auopted in Pennsylvania a
year later.
The temporary senate president, the assembly
speaker, the minority leaders of each house and the chief judge
of the court of appeals would designate one commissioner each
by March 1 of the year following tne decennial federal census.
The commissioner aesignated by the state's highest court would
be chairman.
The commission would have ninety days, acting
by majority vote, to reapportion both legislative houses and
congressional districts. Tlie plans as certified to the
governor would become law, and the state court of appeals would
have had original and exclusive action to adjudicate contests
of the plans. 96
.

Despite partisan opposition to the use of bipartisan or "nonpartisan" reapportionment commissions in New York, the court
of appeals eventually constituted an ad hoc five-member commission with one member from each major party and three "referees" to develop the reapportionment that ultimately was
sustainea in both state and federal courts. ^^

Maryland
The rejected 1958 arafc constitution of Maryland
proposea establishment of a nine-member bipartisan legislative
reaistriccing commission; the majority and minority leaders of
.
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each legislative chamber would designate two commissioners
each and the governor would appoint a ninth commissioner to
serve as chairman witli a tic-breaking vote. No commissioners
could be elective state officials. By majority vote, the
commission would submit a reapportionment plan to the governor who would transmit it to the legislature convening in the
second year after the feaeral decennial census. If no other
plan were prescribed by law within seventy days after the
commission plan was transmitted to the legislature, the
commission plan would have become law. The state court of
appeals would have had original jurisdiction to review any
legislative plan proposed as a substitute for the commission
plan; if the legislative plan were found invalid, the commission plan would become law unless it, too, was held invalid.
In that eventuality the court of appeals would "grant
appropriate relief for the conduct of the impending election. "9a
Dixon, commending the Maryland proposal, noted that it gave
the legislature an opportunity to reapportion if it could
agree upon a plan; yet a governor who preferred the commission plan could veto a legislative plan so that the commission plan v/ould become law unless the legislature could
overriae a veto. 99

The Maryland Constitution was amended in November, 19 7 to
achieve one of the objectives of the 1968 draft that there
be some reapportionment in effect when the legislature fails
to reapportion.
"Following each decennial census" the governor is to prepare a reapportionment plan to be submitted to
the legislative session convening the second year after the
census.
If the legislature fails by the forty-fifth day of
that session to enact a reapportionment, the governor's plan
"shall become law." This arrangement combines gubernatorial
initiative of the Alaska type with the provision that appeared
in the 1968 Maryland uraft constitution to give the legislature a chance to reapportion itself.
A modified and more
elaborate version of the new Maryland reapportionment process
will be presented to the voters for ratification in November,
1972.100

—

Summary:

Development of Reapportionment Agencies

In 1954 there were few formal departures from the tradition
of the 1770s that American state legislatures would reconstruct
themselves periodically to reflect shifting patterns of residence among the populations they represented.
But there were
numerous departures in practice for not a few legislatures
,
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had ignored specific requirements of their state constitutions
in this regard for as much as half a century.
In 1954 only
four states had placed initial responsibility for legislative
reapportionment in a non- legislative agency the ex officio
executive boards or officers of Ohio, Arkansas and Arizona
and a special commission in Missouri.
Nearly a century had
separated Ohio's 1851 adoption of reapportionment by executive
officers from Missouri's 1945 adoption of reapportionment by
special bipartisan commission. Three other states California,
South Dakota and Texas had established backstop agencies
other than their courts to reapportion after legislative
failure at the task. 1^1 Only about one in seven states had
made any systematic departure from the traditional arrangements

—

—

—

.

A decade later the United States Supreme Court consummated
the "one-man, one-vote" revolution with its reapportionment
cases of 19 64.
By the end of that stormy reapportionment
decade, federal and/or state courts in forty-eight states
had been drawn into review of reapportionments and more
than one third of the states had developed some specialized
non- legislative reapportionment agency either to initiate
the matter or to backstop legislatures that failed the task.
,

By the reapportionment year 1971, constitutions of at least
nine states placed responsibility for legislative reapportionment entirely outside the legislature in a special
reapportionment agency, and draft constitutions of two other
states had proposed similar arrangements.-^^^ Nine other
state constitutions had established special non- legislative
officers or agencies other than the courts to backstop legislatures that failed to reapportion; the draft constitution
of a tenth had made a similar proposal. -^^^

Contemporary recognition of legislative difficulties with
reapportionment is impressively indicated by the fact that
ten of fourteen major state constitutional revisions since
1954 considered a non- legislative agency desirable either
to initiate reapportionmentlO'^ or to serve as a backstop. ^'^
Three others (Florida, Rhode Island 196 8 draft and Idaho
1970 draft) specifically vested backstop responsibilities
with the governor and/or the state supreme court, and only
the 1970 Virginia Constitution among modern charters left
the traditional responsibility of the legislature unqualified.
Courts aside, no state has precisely followed the lead of
another state in developing non-legislative apportioning
agencies.
In the following analysis of agency structures,
the functional differences between initiatory and backstop

•35-

—
LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

agencies are ignored. Three general conformations of nonlegislative apportioning agencies can be identified, each
representing attempts to avoid disadvantages discovered in
earlier forms.
1.
The 18 51 Ohio pattern, vesting reapportionment in
a board of elected executive officers serving ex officio,

was followed with minor variations in California, Oklahoma,
North and South Dakota, Texas and Arkansas. ^^^ This was
the first pattern of non-legislative reapportionment agency
to appear, and it preceded the 1964 reapportionment revolution in both time and spirit.
The task of the ex officio
executive officer or board was conceived to be essentially
ministerial to make a mechanical application of rather
precise constitutional rules to new population distributions
revealed by periodic censuses. Since this was not thought
to involve much discretion, the fact that the agents were
state officials elected as political partisans seemed not to
be a serious disadvantage, nor did it appear significant
that their statewide constituency might influence their judgments about desirable contours of districts and apportionments.
Most of these matters were pretty much locked up in the constitution anyway.

—

But application of "one-man, one-vote" principles to reapportionment virtually destroyed the utility of constitutionally
defined districts and apportionment ratios. General standards
of reapportionment such as compactness and contiguity of districts,
specification of single-member and/or multi-member districts,
maximum, minimum, or range of size of chambers and equalization
of populations or representation ratios among constituencies
still seemed desirable constitutional material after 1964.
But it was widely recognized that detailed application of
these norms by an apportioning agency involved many complex
decisions with significant but varying political consequences,
whatever the intent of the apportioning agency, and whether
that agency be the legislature, a court or a specialized
commission. There also was increasing belief that no agency,
even a court, either could or should ignore the political
implications and consequences of reapportionment decisions.
2.
In 1945 Missouri broke from the Ohio pattern to
develop the second principal type of reapportionment agency
a special commission expressly structured on bipartisan lines,
constituted by party leaders or appointed from party-designated
nominees, with equal numbers from each of the major parties.
In a sense the Missouri senate reapportionment commission of
ten members (dating from 19 4 5) and its twenty-member house
reapportionment commission (established in 1966) might be
regarded as an effort to establish non-partisanship, because
each major party had an equal number of seats on the commission.
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Illinois in 1954, Michigan in 1963 ana New Jersey in 1966
followed the Missouri commission pattern; each has individual
variations, but all were evenly bipartisan, comprising equal
numbers of members designated by state party leaders. These
commissions were thought to have several advantages compared
they acknowledged the partisan interests
with the Ohio pattern:
involved in the reapportionment process, at least where the
constitution allowed discretion about districting and apportionments; fairness was sought in an evenly balanced, handsabove- the- table agency. The prototype Missouri commissions
performed adequately in the troubled 1960s. But in Illinois,
Michigan and New Jersey^ all with stronger two-party traditions than Missouri, the even-numbered commissions deadlocked
during the 1960s. New Jersey had nrovided for an additional
tie-breaking member in case of deadlock, and its commission,
thus reconstituted, made an apportionment that became effective after minor judicial modifications.

Connecticut in 1965 developed a transitional form of commission that reflected Missouri-form influences but anticipated the third kind of commission. Majority and minority
legislative leaders, rather than state party agencies,
designated an equal number of commissioners to an eightmember commission.
3.
The third principal form of specialized apportionment
agency, still a variation on the Missouri plan, appeared in
the New York draft constitution of 1967, in the Hawaii and
Pennsylvania constitutions of 1968, and in the Maryland draft
Illinois followed suit in 1970, reconconstitution of 1968.
stituting its earlier Missouri-form commission. In all of
these commissions, an equal number of commissioners is
designated by the majority and minority legislative leaders,
as in the 1965 Connecticut plan; but a tie-breaking additional
member is added to the original designees either by their
election or, failing their agreement, by some other agency
usually one or a majority of the judges of the highest state
The Maryland draft constitution would have had the
court.
governor appoint the tie-breaking chairman. Like the earlier
Missouri-form commissions, these are openly bipartisan agencies
but with a tie-breaking member to reduce the likelihood of
aeadlock. The New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Illinois
commissions would act by simple majority, the Hawaii commission
by a two- thirds majority.

Tne Maryland araft constitution of 1968 proposed still
another variant--of procedure rather than form--that may appeal
to those who would retain some legislative role in reapportionment beyond designation of members of tiie reapportionment
In the year following the census, its commission
commission.
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would prepare a reapportionment to be seasonably presented
The legislature could within a reasonable
to the legislature.
specified time (seventy days in the Maryland prototype) either
modify the commission reapportionment or substitute one of
its own assuming ability to agree upon such substitution or
modification. But at adjournment of the legisative session
following the census, there would be either a commissiondeveloped reapportionment or a legislative apportionment in
existence with the force of law. By 1970 constitutional
amenament, there will be a gubernatorial reapportionment in
effect if the Maryland legislature fails the task in 1972.

—

Provisions in other commission arrangements suggest several
possible variants on this Maryland plan; the tie-breaking
member need not be appointed by the governor, but could be
selected by a majority of state supreme court members, or
even by lot from among nominees of the governor or of the
Since the state court will have jurisdiction to recourt.
view any plan from either commission or legislature, it
might be considered unwise to involve judges in service on
the apportionment commission, but it might be relatively
harmless for supreme court judges to designate the tiebreaking member of the apportionment commission. Moreover,
while the Marylanu governor would have liad veto power over
a legislative reapportionment or modification of the commission reapportionment, such a veto power could be expressly
withheld if that seemed desirable, leaving ultimate review
of the adopted reapportionment only by judicial action.
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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE APPORTIONING AGENCY
No sharper example of "dead-hand" constitutional politics need
be sought than the rigid districting and apportionment formulas
written into state constitutions in the nineteenth century.
If those statements of standards appear in retrospect to have
been efforts to "take out the politics" from decennial reapportionments, such a view ignores the controversy that attended
In the twentieth century, Montana, -^^^ like the
their creation.
rest of the country, simply grew out from under the assumptions
and decisions of an earlier day.
By 1960 the Montana constitutional standard "even-handedly" gave one senator each to
Petroleum County (population 89 4) and Yellowstone County (popuThe four most populous counties, with more
lation 79,016).
than a third of the state's population, and the four smallest
counties, with less than 1 percent of the state's population,
were equally represented; each group had four senators.

The one-man, one-vote revolution swept away that archaic
structure, and a new constitutional convention must consider
to what extent it wishes its view of life to shape legislative
representation for an unforeseeable future.

Requirements that districts be constructed from whole counties
or combinations of whole counties and that apportionments must
start with a first representative for some basic representation
unit have proven to be incompatible with legislatures of
But generalized requirements that districts
reasonable size.
be compact, of contiguous territory and equal in population
are common in modern state constitutions.
Modifiers like "as
possible" or "as practicable" or "due regard" are sometimes
added, but they raise the general problem that words added to
state constitutions often restrict and rigidify future options.
In the reapportionment process, they also may increase the
opportunities for litigation to upset the process. Many state
constitutions foreclose the option between single-member and
multi-member districts, evidently on the ground that this
fundamental decision about the nature of representation belongs
in the constitution rather than in the legislature itself.
Size of Chamber

Modern state constitutions commonly either fix the size or
the range of size of the legislative chambers -^^^ Reapportionment considerations are involved in either approach. A
.

-39-

LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

constitutionally mandated size removes that factor from
negotiation or policy decision by the apportioning agency, but
may create a situation where the ratio of seats to total population proves particularly awkward. A range of size opens
that factor to policy decision by the apportioning agency and
allows flexibility to seek out a size for which the ratio of
seats to total population has a superior "fit" to local populations and existing districts.
Reapportionment history suggests the value of an upper limit
on membership to check the natural political tendency to create
more seats, rather than to reduce the number. This may be
particularly important where multi-member districting is common:
in such instances, reapportionment would tend to leave as many
constituencies undisturbed as possible, simply adding seats
Conversely, a minimum size
for the rapid-growth districts.
may have particular value if single-member districting is the
pattern, for two reasons:
With a relatively large number of districts to redefine
1.
at each reapportionment, the problem is simplified technically,
if not politically, by having fewer districts.
The larger the average population per district, the
2.
greater the absolute variance of population for a given percentage of variance. This might induce the reapportioning
agency seeking small percentage variances among districts to
create fewer, larger districts ^^^
.

There is no objective base for determining ideal size of a
legislative chamber. Among T^erican state legislatures, some
of the most populous states have some of the smaller chambers,
while some of the least populous have very large legislative
Each California state senator represents about
chambers.
seven-tenths as many people as the entire population of Montana.
Only Georgia (56), Illinois (58), Iowa (61), Minnesota (67),
Twenty
and New York (57) have larger senates than Montana.
senators suffice in Alaska and Nevada, 2 8 in Utah, 30 in
Arizona, Oregon and Wyoming, 31 in Texas, 35 in Colorado and
South Dakota and 49 for the entire Nebraska unicameral legislature.
Twenty-three states have larger houses of representatives than Montana's 100 members, ranging up to 400 in New
Hampshire, for a population about the same size as Montana.
If Montana were to impose the national average of constituents
per state legislator, the state would have a senate of only
eight members and a house of only twenty. ^•'0 A particular,
state is apt to establish this factor as a balance among
several considerations--historical tradition, strength of
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regional sensibilities, the comfortable seating capacity of
existing chambers and an ultimately political balance between
efficiency in smaller size versus pluralism and diversity of
representation presumed in larger size.

Reduction of size beyond some undetermined minimum would have
too few members to fill out a
two objectionable results:
diversified committee structure, and an acute sense of loss
of representation in some areas of the state.
In Montana, the
physical size of legislative districts must also be considered.
With the present senate of fifty members, some districts comprise four or five counties and have physical dimensions in
excess of 200 miles.

Population Base
Most states rest legislative representation on total population
enumerated in the most recent federal or state census, but a
few restrict the base.
Alaska [Art. VI, Sec. 3] limits the
base to "civilian population" and Hawaii [Art. Ill, Sec. 4]
to the "number of voters registered in the last preceding
general election. "Hi New York's apportionment to citizen
population and Tennessee's base of "qualified voters" have been
sustained by federal courts. ^2 rpj^g Arkansas Constitution
[Art. 3, Sec. 3] excludes from the population base the inmates
of prisons and mental institutions and persons not legal
Restrictions that diminish the total population
residents.
base may be sustainable legally if they do not deprive eligible
voters of representation or persons of the equal protection of
the laws (such as freedom from taint of discrimination against
particular minorities) H^
.

The present Montana constitutional provisions [Art. VI, Sec. 2]
that the legislative chambers "shall be apportioned on the basis
of population" and congressional districts [Art. VI, Sec. 1]
"as may be prescribed by law" seem entirely consistent with
requirements of the national Constitution.
The 1958 Rhode
Island draft constitution [Art. IV, Sees. 4, 5] labored the
obvious with a provision that the apportionment base must be
"population consistent with federal constitutional standards."

Standards of Eouality
Many modern state constitutions explicitly state the equalization to be achieved among legislative districts.
Several
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formulas appear; ranged from the most rigorous to the most
flexible, they require:

—
Art.

Equal population "

Ill, Sec.

[Idaho 1970 draft constitution.

W.

—

Equal as possible " [Rhode Island 1968 draft
constitution. Art. IV, Sec. 5].

—

Equal as practicable " [Arkansas Constitution, Art.
37 Virginia Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6; Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 16; New York 1967
draft constitution. Art. Ill, Sec. 2c].
Ill, Sec^

--" Substantially equal "

[Illinois Constitution, Art. IV.
Maryland 1968 draft constitution. Art. Ill, Sec. 3.04;
New Mexico 1969 draft constitution. Art. Ill, Sec. 5].
Sec.

3a;

—

In accordance with the constitution of the State
and of the United States " [Florida Constitution, Art. TTI
Sec.

16].

The most rigorous formulas present potentially serious problems.
If the stated standard is absolute equality, it is unattainable;
if the standard is equal "as possible" or "as practicable,"
any reapportionment may be subjected to unsettling challenge
by petitioners appearing in court with a plan that shaves a
percentage point or so from the one adopted by the apportioning
agency.
The 1969 federal Qase on congressional districting,
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler ,-^-^^ seems to have said that the apportioning agency did not show good faith when it adopted a plan
with wider population variances than another plan that had
been before it. This strategy was involved in the judicial
challenge to the 1971 Montana reapportionment acts^l^ and could
furnish a basis for appeal from the district court decision
sustaining that reapportionment.
Of course that litigation
indicates that the problem can be pleaded even in the absence
of a rigorously stated population standard in a constitution.
But the statement might give increased substance to such chalDixon favors the "substantial equality" formula as one
lenge.
that meets both Fourteenth Amendment requirements and considerations of fair and effective representation. -'^" The Florida
formula accord with state and federal constitutional standards
would accommodate any subsequent relaxation of current Fourteeenth
Amendment standards, however broad. It would cover the 1966
Montana constitutional amendment [Art. VI, Sec. 2 (3)] to permit
return to one-senator-per-county representation when allowed
by the national Constitution.

—
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Several constitutions that employ the "equal as possible"
or "equal as practicable" standard also require single-member
It does not appear that these formulas necessarily
districts.
would create difficulties for multi-member districting so long
as the quotient derived from dividing the total district population by its number of representatives is substantially
equal in all instances.
Tt seems clear that the current Montana constitutional provision
[Art. VI, Sec. 2 (1)] that "the senate and house of represent-

atives of the legislative assembly each shall be apportioned
on the basis of population" meets current or anticipated constitutional requirements of the national Constitution regarding
the standard of equality.

District Contours

Older state constitutions commonly required preservation of
county or district boundaries in reapportionment. These
requirements often were incompatible with "one-man, one-vote"
redistricting--particularly in combination with constitutional
assignments of minimum or fixed numbers of representative seats
The 1889 Montana Constitution proved
to such subdivisions.
The 1966 constitutional amendto be archaic in both respects.
ment to Articles V and VI created districting requirements that
are essentially in line with the modern state constitutions-with one possible exception. Article VI, Section 3 now states:
Senatorial and representative districts may be altered
from time to time as public convenience may require.
When a senatorial or representative district shall be
composed of two or more counties, they shall be
contiguous, and the districts as compact as may be.H^
An argument might be made that this language prohibits combination
of portions of counties with other counties, as was done in
reapportioning the 1971 Montana Legislature. But if tested in
court, the districting probably would be sustained at the
expense of the constitutional language, or the language might
be simply construed to permit combination of portions of counties.
A simple statement that "districts shall be contiguous and
compact as may be" would reflect the pattern common in most
modern constitutions and might be distinctly more desirable
Nearly all the modern
than the language in some of them.
constitutions require districts to be both compact and contiguous
in territory, but a few require only one of the two standards '•^°
.
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Several modern constitutions still state the desirability of
districting that follows boundaries of existing political subdivisions; these provisions are tempered by an escape clause such
as "due regard" or "wherever practicable "119 The New Mexico
draft constitution of 1969 [Art. Ill, Sec. 5(c)] would have
required districting by "whoxe administrative election districts."
This could have proved troublesome when precinct boundaries did
not coincide with the boundaries of census enumeration districts.
Precinct and census enumeration district boundaries frequently
do not coincide in Montana, and the 19 71 Montana House Committee
on Reapportionment tinkered through most of the regular session
with reapportionment plans based upon populations imputed to
precincts, rather than populations actually enumerated in 19 70
census enumeration tracts.
The risk that such an imputed population base would have been invalidated in a court challenge
was very high, and the reapportionment act eventually passed
in the second special session used census division boundaries
rather than precincts where counties were divided. 1^^
.

just noted, the Maryland and New York draft constitutions proposed that "natural boundaries" or "natural geographic boundaries"
also be considered in redistricting.
The Hawaii and Michigan
constitutions contain specific references to problems raised
by non-contiguity of territory separated by substantial expanses
of open water, but these seem not relevant for Montana.

x\s

Several constitutions attempt to recognize cultural homogeneity
as a desirable factor in districing.
The Alaska Constitution
[Art. VI, Sec. 6] requires "as nearly as practicable a relatively
integrated socio-economic area" and the Hawaii Constitution
(Art. Ill, Sec. 4 (8)] states that "where practicable, submergence of an area in a larger district wherein substantially
different socio-economic interests predominate shall be avoided."
Such provisions might be guarded recognition of special minority
problems in the two westernmost states; they could be doubleedged if applied to achieve segregation of racial representation
rather than the affirmative values of equal protection for
minorities.
The Michigan Constitution [Art. IV, Sec. 3] seems
to imply a standard of internal coherence that might have some
interest in Montana; Michigan districts are to be not only
compact and contiguous, but "convenient."
It can be argued that the constitutional statement of such
criteria multiplies the opportunities for judicial challenge
of reapportionments, and that contour requirements beyond
compactness and contiguity should be entrusted to statute or
the discretion of the reapportioning agency.
In effect, the
constitutions that omit requirements resolve the matter in that
fashion.
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Single- or Multi-Member Districts

Robert Luce wrote forty years ago that "the most difficult and
most controverted problem of apportionment concerns the number
of members to be elected from a district "'^^ At mid-century
there was substantial debate among political scientists about
which style of districtina had prevailed in the past. 122 Some
of the confusion arises from difference of emphasis and whether
districts or representatives are counted.
It appears that at
mid-century and on the eve of the reapportionment revolution
of the 1960s, more American state legislators were elected from
single-member districts than from multi-member districts.
Klain's tally for 1954 indicated that about 88 percent of all
state senators and about 55 percent of state representatives
were elected from single-member districts -123 This compares
closely with a tally made in 1962 indicating that single-member
districts prevailed by at least three-to-one in lower chambers,
and at least twelve- to-one in state senates.
In that year, 84
percent of all state senators and 54 percent of all state representatives were elected from single-member districts. 1^4
.

.

The effect of massive and basic reapportionment on districting
patterns during the past decade is not readily discerned at
this juncture.
In 1970, twenty-six of fifty state senates
and seventeen of forty-nine state houses of representatives were
elected exclusively from single-member districts, and in those
chambers electing partially from multi-member districts, a
majoritv of districts (if not members elected) were singlemember. 125
Of more interest for Montanans has been the Treasure State's
experience with the choice between single-member and multimember districting. For a century the preponderant majority
of Montana territorial and state legislators were elected from
single-member districts; all senators had been elected from
single-member single-county districts from 1889 and most house
members had also been elected from such districts until 1965.
7^s noted earlier the balance was sharply
reversed by the
judicial reapportionment in that year.
Subsequent legislatures,
finding good the system by which they were elected, have deepened
their preference for the multi-member district.
Critics of the
trend would suggest that preference is mixed with inability or
unwillingness to come to grips with the technically demanding
task of creating a large number of single-member districts of
substantially equal population.

The scholarly literature is not notably helpful in its discussion
of the relative merits of the two modes of representation. 126
Like the more general question of the nature of representation.
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most of the arguments for one system or the other are apt to
appear more polemical than persuasive, depending upon the particular representation values that inform the advocate.

Proponents of the single-member district are apt to make one
or more of the following claims for that mode of representation: 127
The district is relatively small in area and population;
1.
this fosters personal identification between the constituent
and the single legislator from the commencement of the campaign
through the term of legislative service.
2.
In the smaller districts, campaign expenses would be
reduced, opening candidacy to people who otherwise would be
deterred by the costs and rigors of at-large candidacy in a
populous urban district or a far-flung rural district.

The relative intimacy of relationships of each constit3.
uent to one legislator will keep the legislator more responsible
to those he represents; constituents will know, or readily
learn, to whom they should address their desires, and they can
more readily follow and evaluate voting performance of the
representative

Because districts are relatively small, territorially
4.
based minorities within the larger community gain representation
that would be denied them by dominant majorities of a larger
constituency.
To these central claims the critics of single-member districts
are apt to make these rejoinders:

Localization of interests in the smaller constituencies
1.
gives undue advantages to narrow and parochial interests;
recognition of larger values for the entire political community
tends to be diminished.
2.

The base for recruitment of effective representatives

is too narrow, diminishing the stature of representatives and

the quality of legislation.
3.
The decennial problem of redefining the more numerous
boundaries of single-member districts is unduly costly and
disruptive of district continuity.
4.
The increased opportunities for gerrymandering of
district boundaries will tend to perpetuate representation of
locally dominant groups.

Proponents of multi-member districts also may make these claims
for their favored mode of representation:
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Group representation of the larger community fosters
1.
team representation and increases the community's "clout" in
the legislature.
2.
Party responsibility for recruitment and discipline
of its members is fostered by group representation; tnis improves
the quality of representation, while achieving economies to be
had in group candidacy.
3.
The larger view of things is fostered by the broader
constituency; local and immediate interest-group pressures
upon particular legislators are cushioned by group representation.

Proponents of single-member districts are apt to argue, in
turn, that such points simply prove their claims for better
representation from the smaller district.
1.
They ask how a voter can make rational choices from
a list of a dozen or more candidates.
2.
They argue that in many situations the larger multimember district is simply a massive gerrymander for the communitywide majority.

They suggest that candidates need not live in the
3.
district represented, but might be required to "stand" in a
particular district--the pattern frequently practiced in British
parliamentary elections.

Multi-member advocates might counter that local residence of
candidates is a deeply treasured American tradition.
And so the arguments run.
So much depends upon the particular
context of representation, varying from state to state and from
region to region within states, that values appearing to have
an objective basis to their advocates are simply dismissed by
critics who consider some other factor or value to have more
merit or significance.

Reapportionment to one-man, one-vote standards may have encouraged
an increasing use of multi-member districts for several fairly
obvious reasons:
Reapportionment in the 19 60s gave substantial increments
1.
of representation to urban centers in Montana the four largest
cities, already represented in muiti-member districts of
moderate size, gained seventeen more senators and nine more
representatives by the reapportionment of 1965. Consequently,
it was easier simply to assign additional seats to these
populous centers than to devise systems for their subdivision.
;
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2.
Moreover, it is easier technically and politically
to combine counties of small population, giving them multi-member
representation, than to divide them up, attaching portions to

other counties. Arithmetic reinforces political interests:
it
is easier to create a small number of large multi-member districts than to achieve a small absolute population variance
among each of many smaller single-member districts.
It is easier technically and politically to create a
3.
fairly small set of districts for the senate, and then just
double the apportionment to these districts for the house of
representatives; by this device single-member representation
simply disappeared from the Montana house or representatives
in the 19 71 reapportionment.
4.
Incumbent legislators who "made it" to the legislature
from sizeable multi-member districts are little disposed to
examine a winner's combination very critically.
This is particularly true if and when they recognize a partisan advantage
in perpetuating the basis for their own partisan majorities
or pluralities.
The countywide pluralities of Republicans in
Yellowstone County and of Democrats in Silver Bow County are
fundamental, widely recognized facts of legislative politics
and reapportionment in Montana.

The 19 71 Montana reapportionment legislation did afford voters
in multi-member districts the option to establish single-member
districts by special local election, but the concession may not
have been sxobstantial, since the districtwide majorities that
find advantage in large multi-member districts will be in a
position to defeat the single-member district alternative in
the special election. 128
5.
The relative intricacies of single-member districting
sorely tax the legislature as an apportioning agency particularly
if it operates under rigorous time limitations.
It seems
scarcely coincidence that among the states that have developed
specialized reapportioning agencies in recent years, the great
majority also require single-member districts in one or both
chambers of their legislature. -"-^^

—

Of course the constitution need not resolve the choice among
the two styles of districting, but Montana experience suggests
that when there is no specification, the multi-member district
is apt to thrive and proliferate.
Resolution of the choice by
constitutional statement seems to be the prevailing pattern in
modern constitutions; it serves as a check against the possible
disposition of legislatures simply to perpetuate and deepen the
system by which incumbents have gained election.
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Gerrymandering
This indigenous American political term intrigues Europeans
and its best definition may be in the Oxford English Dictionary
"to manipulate in order to gain an unfair advantage."
The American Political Dictionary adequately characterizes what
goes on in single-member districting:
:

The drawing of legislative district boundary lines with
a view to obtaining partisan or factional advantage
The object is to spread the support for one's party
over many districts and to concentrate the support
for the other party in few districts. ^^
.

.

.

.

This definition scarcely covers tlie equally powerful advantage
derived by spreading a majority interest to multiple representatives within a district.

Statements of constitutional standards for reapportionment-compactness, contiguity and equality of population in the
districts all are efforts to limit the search for unfair
political advantage. But modern experience suggests that the
most effective protection against unfair political advantage
may lie elsewhere--notably in the general recognition that
political interests and values are inevitably at stake, however
"automatic" the process may be made to appear.
In a fundamental
sense, "automatic" features are simply programmed protections
of certain political interests, as contrasted to others.

—

Any boundary defined in the reapportionment process will have
political consequences for people on either side of the line,
whether or not those consequences are perceived or even imagined
The political consequences of line-drawing
by the draftsman.
are not necessarily diminished, and may indeed be accentuated,
by apportionment of multiple representatives among fewer disThese points could well be axioms of the reapportioning
tricts.
agency and of the voting public.
It is almost ecjually axiomatic,
and perhaps more broadly recognized, that the legislator as
reapportioning agent would draw the boundaries of his own
district first, and let others fall where they may.
This is
one reason, but not the only one, why legislatures have difficulties in reapportioning themselves.
The legislator's understandable predilection to protect his own interest has become
particularly difficult to reconcile with the technically
demanding aspects or "one-man, one-vote" reapportionment to
narrow tolerances of variation among constituency populations.

Districting and apportionment lie at the heart of representation
and make reapportionment a quintessentially political process.
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whether its practitioners recognize the fact or not. To deny
this aspect of the problem creates grave misconceptions.
Nor
can computers escape the basic facts.
They can draw lines, but
only to orders given by programmers who, in turn, are instructed
by politicians; and politicians in the end select the computer
product that on balance pleases them most or displeases them
least.
In a state where each major party is reported to retain the
services of a full-time reapportionment expert, the New York
draft constitution of 1968 proposed [Art. Ill, Sec. 2(c)]:
"Gerrymandering for any purpose is prohibited." Had that
provision become basic law, there is no reason to suppose the
party experts on districting and reapportionment would have
had to seek new employment.

The quest of a number of modern constitutions for openly bipartisan reapportioning agencies, in which major political interests
are acknowledged and required to operate over the table with
a narrow balance of forces modified only by a tie-breaker to
avoid deadlock, may be the best protection against unfair
political advantage currently discernible on the American reapportionment scene. This turns consideration back to the importance of an appropriate agency for the task.

-50-

LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

NOTES

1.

"Representation," Nomos X, Yearbook
Roland Pennock, ed.
of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy
brings together ideas of
Atherton, 1968)
(New York:
nearly two dozen contemporary students of the subject.

J.

,

,

2.

herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Governnote 41 at p.
ment rev. ed. (New York: Holt, 1949)
,

,

231.
3.

Robert Luce, Leg islative Principles (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1930), pp. 337, 340, 342 and generally Ch 15,
"Places of Population." Cited hereafter as Luce, LegisAlfred Z. Reed, The Territorial
lative Principles
Basis of Government Under the State Constitutions No.
106, Columbia University Studies in history. Economics
ana Public Law (New York, 1911)
at p
18 notes that
territorial aistricts were conceived to have fixed
bounaaries in the colonial period. At page 137, Reed
stated:
"It may be said that the principle of proportionate representation of localities was just beginning
The
to develop at this time [the American Revolution]."
miudle and Southern colonies granted representation to
territorial units with little regard to their populations;
but the point nas been made that in these colonies population was rather evenly distributed so that extreme
variances of representation in relation to population may
have been in the magnitude of 2 3 to 1 in Virginia.
See
Auvisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Apportionment of State Legislature s (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 8.
.

.

,

.

,

4.

157:
"[t]he people, when the legislative is once
constituted, having in such a government ... no power
to act as long as the government stands, tnis inconvenience
All quotations from
is thought incapable of a remedy "
Everyman's Library edition (New York: Dutton, 1924),

Sec.

.

^ec.

5.

Ibiu.

6.

Ibid

7.

See also
Luce, Legislative Principle s, pp. 34 3, 350.
Robert McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of
Equal Representation (New York: Twentieth Century Fund,
Cited hereafter as McKav, Law and Politics.
1965), p. 21.

,

158.

.

•51-

8.

Continued "dual representation" of some voters in their
place of business and in university constituencies were
minor exceptions to this pattern from 1832 until 1948.

9.

Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation;
Reapportiomrtent in Law and Politics (New York:
Oxford University
Press, 1968), p. 94.
Cited hereafter as Dixon, Democratic
Representation
At pp. 91-96, Dixon briefly discusses
apportionment practice in the United Kingdom and West
Germany.
.

10.

Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U.S. 533, 573, note 52 (1964) citing
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Apportionment of State Legislatures (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 10-11, 35 and 69.

11.

Herweg

39th Legislative Assembly

v.

,

246 Fed. Supp. 454

(1965).
12.

McKay, Law and Politics

13.

Ibid

.

14.

Ibid

.

15.

William J.

,

,

p.

24.

26-27.

pp.

Dixon, Democratic Representation p. 84 states
p. 28.
,
"In some states it was easier simply to stop reapportioning."
,

Boyd, Changing Patterns of Apportionment
National Municipal League, 1965), p. 25:
"There
were states like New York in which constitutional formulas
for apportionment were so clearly rigged in favor of one
section of the state and one political party that reapportionment was accomplished with some degree of regularity
since it did not post a threat to the dominant party."
This represents still anotner variation; both parties in
Montana appear to have enjoyed local advantages from malapportionment, depending upon the interest or the region
of the state; see Ellis Waldron, "Reapportionment and
Political Partisanship in the 1966 Montana Legislative
Election," Montana Business Quarterly (Fall, 1966):
11-28.
D.

{New York:

16.

Dixon, Democratic Representation

17.

Ibid

18.

See Ellis Waldron, "Montana" chapter in Impact of Reapportionment on the Thirteen Western States E. Bushnell, ed.
(Salt Lake:
University of Utah Press, 1970); "100 Years
of Reapportionment in Montana," Montana Law Review 2 8
(Fall, 1966); "Montana's 1966 Legislative Apportionment
Amendment," Montana Business Quarterly (Winter, 1965).

19.

Organic Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 426, Sec. 5:
"The apportionment
shall be based upon ... an enumeration of
the qualified electors of the said several legislative
districts
and from other sources of information as

.

,

,

p.

67.

85.

p.

.

.

.

.

.

.

-52-

.

will enable the governor, without taking a new census, to
make an apportionment which shall fairly represent the
but
people of the several districts in both houses
the legislature may at any time change the legislative
districts of the territory as fixed by the governor."
.

.

.

20.

See Montana, Constitutional Convention of 1889, Proceedings
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention (Helena:
State Publishing Co., 1921), pp. 622-626; 629-636; 942-945.
Little of the rhetoric of reapportionment employed in the
1960s was new; almost all of the principal arguments had
been voiced in Helena in 1889. There were thirty-nine
Democrats, thirty-five Republicans and one Independent
in the 1889 Convention; the four western-most mining
counties--Silver Bow, Lewis ana Clark, Deer Lodge and
Missoula--were represented by twenty Democrats, eighteen
Republicans and the one Independent; the four easternmost counties, Custer, Dawson, Yellowstone and Fergus,
were represented by six Republicans and three Democrats.

21.

The Montana Constitution [Art. V, Sec. 4] states "there
shall be no more than one Senator from each county" and
[Art. VI, Sec. 4] "each of said counties sliall be entitled to one Senator, but in no case shall a Senatorial
district consist of more than one county." The latter
provision was deleted by amendment in 1966.

22.

The Montana Constitution [Art. VI, Sec. 2] directed the
legislature to conauct an enumeration of inhabitants in
1895 and every tenth year thereafter, and at the legislative sessions after this state census and after the
decennial United States census, to apportion representation "on the basis of such eniomeration according to
ratios to be fixed by law." The state censuses and
seventh-year reapportionments were never implemented, and
this provision aisappeared by amendment in 1966.

23.

Reynolds v. Sims
cases

24.

lierweg v.

25.

Roberts v. Eabcock 246 Fed. Supp. 396 (1965) for the
congressional districts; iierweg v. Butte (U.S.D.C. Mont.,
Civil Ho. 1232, unreported, 1965) for aldermanic reapportionment.

26.

1967 Laws of Montana

27.

1971 Law s of Montana , 1st Lxtra Session, Ch

28.

Wolu V. Anderson Civil No. 939 (U.S.D.C. Montana,
Opinion and Order, June 11, 1971).

,

377 U.S.

39th Assembly

,

533

(1964)

and associated

246 Fed. Supp.

454

(1965)

,

,

Ch.

194.

,

-53-

.

3.

.

.

29.

Ibid

.

(Order, July 26,

30.

Ibid

.

(Order and Opinion, Nov. 22, 1971).

31.

The Fourteenth Amendment subsequently invalidated original
provisions for enumeration of slaves at three-fifths the
number of "free persons" and required representation of
any state to be reduced for abridgment in federal elections of the vote of 21-year-old male citizens, except
The latter profor participation in crime or rebellion.
vision never was implemented during the long period of
state discrimination against Negro participation in elecThe Sixteenth Amendment clarified the status of
tions.
the federal income tax as an indirect tax that need not
be apportioned to population; in general, poll taxes and
property taxes are considered to be "direct" taxes whose
incidence must be apportioned to population, thereby
effectively preventing their levy by the national government.

32.

William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States (Englewood
See also
Prentice-Hall, 1964)
Cliffs, N.J.
p. 71.
Andrew Hacker, Congressional Districting (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1963)

1971).

:

33.

,

applied to Montana
Wesberry V. Sanders 376 U.S. 1 (1964)
congressional districts in Roberts v. Babcock 246 Fed.
,

,

,

Supp. 396
34.

(1965).

Alfred Z. Reed, The Territorial Basis of Government Under
the State Constitutions No 106, Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law (New York,
1911)
pp. 137-234 may be the most detailed and systematic
review of the bases of representation through the nineteenth century. Cited hereafter as Reed, TerritorialSee also Luce, Legislative Principles Chs^ T, 5
Basis
,

I

,

.

,

and 15.
35.

Reed, Territorial Basis p. 155 ff. for discussion of
periodicity of reapportionments, and Luce, Legislative
Principles pp. 350-355, for discussion of the evolving
pattern of periodicity in legislative reapportionments.
Belle Zeller, ed. American State Legislatures (New
York:
Crowell, 1954)
p. 43 notes the situation in 1954.
,

,

,

,

36.

Reed, Territorial Basis p. 138 ff. regards the 1776
Pennsylvania arrangement for septennial reapportionment by
the legislation "in proportion to the number of taxable
inhabitants" [1776 Pennsylvania Const. Sec. 17] to have
been the most emulated provision among early state constitutions. The first constitutions of South Carolina,
Maryland and Georgia appear to have left little if any
role for the legislature.
,
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37.

As noted earlier, modern iiritisii practice follows Locke's
lead, placing periodic districtiny of Parliament in the
hands of non-legislative boundary commissions.

38.

Reed, Territorial Basis

39.

Ibid

.

,

p.

240.

40.

Ibid

.

,

p.

238.

41.

Ibid.

,

p.

150.

42.

1851 Ohio Const. Art. XI, Sec. 11.

43.

Stewart R. Jaffy, "The Criteria of the Ohio Constitutional
Convention of 1850-1851," Reapportioning Legislatures
Merrill, 1966)
ed. Howard D. Hamilton (Columbus:
p. 52.
Cited hereafter as Jaffy, "Criteria of the Oiiio Conven-

,

p.

45.

,

,

tion.

"

44.

1802 Ohio Const. Art. I, Sees.

45.

State ex rel. Dudley v. Evans , 1 Ohio State 422, 423
(1853), quoted in Jaffy, "Criteria of the Ohio Convention," p. 53.

46.

Jaffy, "Criteria of the Ohio Convention," p. 56.

47.

Nolan v. Rhodes 378 U.S. 556 (1964) was one of the memorandum decisions announced June 22, 1964, a week after
See also Dixon,
the principal case of Reynolds v. Sims
Democratic Representation , p. 83, and McKay, Law and
Politics p. 27 for the historic place of the Ohio "Hannah
Amendment" along with Montana's constitutional provisions
of 1889 in the early modern flight from representation
based on population.

2,

6.

,

.

,

48.

Belle Zeller, ed. American State Legislatures (New York:
Crowell, 1954)
pp. 41-42 and Ch. 3 generally for description of the status at mid-century. Cited hereafter as
The Oregon Constitution
Zeller, American Legislatures
simply required that the number of legislators be fixed
by law, and the Tennessee Constitution simply said the
Delaware fixed
legislature should be reapportioned.
details in its constitution. The Idaho and Nevada constitutions also fixed districts and the number of representaIn New York
tives but allowed their revision by statute.
and Oklahoma, legislative reapportionment was specifically
made subject to judicial review.
,

,

.
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There was no majority opinion. Seven
328 U.S. 549.
IVo justices agreed with Justice
justices participated.
Frankfurter that enforcement of congressional legislation
for congressional districting was for Congress, not the
courts; warning of judicial entry into "this political
"Of course no court can
thicket," Frankfurter said:
At
affirmatively re-map the Illinois districts
best we could only declare the existing electoral system
invalid." This was not one of the great justice's most
prescient comments. Justice Black spoke for three who
believed that federal courts clearly could intervene to
protect the voting rights under the equal protection
guarantees of the 14th Amendment, and that they should
have done so in the Colegrove case. Justice Rutledge,
holding the "swing vote" agreed that the courts had jurisdiction to fashion an equitable remedy in appropriate
reapportionment cases, but opposed intervention in the
Colegro ve case because a congressional election was immiThus, the court alignment was 4-3 that federal
nent.
courts could intervene to compel reapportionment in
appropriate cases, and 4-3 that the Colegrove action was
It is no partinot appropriate for such intervention.
cular tribute to legal research that Frankfurter's position was commonly cited as describing the holding in the

49.

....

case.

Justices Frankfurter

50.

Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
and Harlan dissented.

51.

Wesberry v. Sanders 376 U.S. 1 (1964), interpreting the
obligation of states to give equitable congressional representation under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution governing congressional elections.

52.

Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and associated cases,
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that "no
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
state
the equal protection of the laws."

,

,

,

;

.

.

.

53.

Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 300-313 summarizes
the Illinois experience; Dixon observed (at p. 311) that
computers "after three or four hours of programming, could
produce within thirty seconds the answer to a suggestion
which had already been found by hand and discarded."

54.

This summary of judicial involvement was derived from
state surveys in National Municipal League, Apportionment
revised in parts
in the Nineteen Sixties (New York, 1967)
to November, 1970, unpaged, and hereafter cited as Apportionment in the 1960s , and from state svimmaries in Dixon,
Democratic Representation pp. 589-633.

,

,

,

Sec.

55.

Maine Const. Art. IV, Pt.

56.

Proposed Rhode Island Constitution of 1968, Art. IV, Sec»

1,
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3.
5.

57.

Arkansas Const. Art. Ill, Sec. 4c; Hawaii Const. Art. Ill,
Sec. 4; Illinois Const. Art. IV, Sec. 3; Michigan Const.
Compare Oklahoma Const. Art. V, Sec. IID;
Art. IV, Sec. 6.
Proposed Maryland Constitution of 1968, Art. Ill, Sec. 3.06;
Proposed New Mexico Constitution of 1969, Art. Ill, Sec. 5E;
Proposed Idaho Constitution of 1970, Art. Ill, Sec. 4.

58.

The Alaska Constitution [Art. VI, Sec. 11] allows thirty
days for voter action to compel performance by apportionment commission or governor; Florida Constitution [Art.
Ill, Sec. 16] gives fifteen to sixty days to compel certain
performances; Michigan [Art. IV, Sec. 6] gives sixty days
to compel certain performances.

59.

See Alaska Constitution [Art. VI, Sec. 11] providing
thirty days for a trial court of general jurisdiction to
review an apportionment; Hawaii [Art. Ill, Sec. 4] providing forty-five days for judicial review of a reapportionment, and Michigan [Art. IV, Sec. 6] giving sixty
days for court review of an apportionment commission plan.

60.

Illinois Const. Art. IV, Sec. 3; Proposed New Mexico Constitution of 1969, Art. Ill, Sec. 5E. Proposed Idaho
Constitution of 1970, Art. Ill, Sec. 4 gave original state
supreme court jurisdiction "whenever the [apportionment]
statute materially fails to meet the [constitutional]
requirements for districts," leaving unclear whether the
court would initiate the action or accept a citizen suit.
The language implies an affirmative finding of what such
a suit would seek to establish as the basis for granting
the jurisdiction to determine the question.

61.

State Government News (Lexington: The Council of State
Governments, Vol. 14, No. 12, December, 1971), p. 2.

62.

Dixon, Democratic Representation

63.

Florida Const. Art. Ill, Sec. 16. This 1968 provision was
enacted after a stormy struggle over reapportionment that
involved the legislature, the governor and both federal
and state courts for more than a decade. See Manning
Dauer, "Florida Reapportionment," Apportionment in the
1960s and Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 444-445
and 596-597.

,

,

64.

p.

364.

,

Oregon Const. Art. IV, Sec. 6. See Clay Meyers, "Oregon
Reapportionment (1970) ," Apportionment in the 19603 and
Dixon, Democratic Represer^at ion note 46 at p. 116 citing
the cases involved, and p. 620.
,

,

65.

California Const. Art. IV, Sec.

-57-

6.

,

66.

Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 370-378, summarizing
the California experience, stressed the value for the
legislators of rather precise judicial guidelines that
narrowed opportunity for the almost endless "nudging" of
particular district lines that plagues legislative
approach to the problem. See also Alvin Sokolow, "California Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 1960s
"California Reapportionment: A New Amendment,'
R. Adickes
646, proposed
Southern California Law Review 40 (1967):
a twelve-member mixed commission that would add eight
legislators, evenly distributed among the major parties,
to the ex officio members presently designated, removing
the state superintendent of public instruction; an eightvote majority would be required for commission decisions.
,

.

,

67.

Oklahoma Const. Art. 5, Sec. IIA. Dixon, Democratic
Representation pp. 292-300, 619, summarized federal
judicial intervention and court adoption of a reapportionment plan prepared by the attorney general (as
defendant in a litigation) as one of the less desirable
examples of judicial intervention to accomplish "instant reapportionment" without adequate regard for bipartisan political considerations; "one is left almost
breathless by the casual decision-making process judically
employed [p. 299]." See also George Mauer, "Oklahoma Reapportionment (19 70)," Apportionment in the 1960s
,

.

68.

North Dakota Const. Art. II, Sec. 35.

69.

See H. J. Tomasek, "North Dakota Reapportionment,"
Apportionment in the 1960s Dixon, Democratic Representation 364 and 618. An initiated constitutional
amendment in 1960 had frozen a 1931 senate apportionment into the constitution; Paulson v. Meier 232 Fed.
Supp. 183, 186 (1964) appeared to have held the entire
Section 35 of Article II to be unconstitutional along
with two other apportionment sections of the constitution, but no revision of the procedural provisions for
the apportioning board appears to have been made as
recently as 1971; the matter may have been left for
redefinition by the North Dakota Constitutional Convention of 1971.
;

,

70.

South Dakota Const. Art. Ill, Sec.

71.

See Alan Clem, "South Dakota Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 1960s; Dixon, Democratic Representation ,
364n, 618.

72.

Texas Const. Art. Ill, Sec. 28. See Riley Fletcher,
"Texas Reapportionment, Apportionment in the 1960s ; Dixon,
Democratic Representation , 364n and 623-624.
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5.

.

73.

Proposed New Mexico Constitution of 1969, Art. Ill, Sec.
See James Harvey, "Legislative Apportiomrient in New
5.
Mexico," Apportionment in the 1960s Dixon, Democratic
Representation pp. 517, 614-615, noting rejection of a
weighted voting plan.
;

,

74.

Connecticut Const. Art. Ill, Sec.

75.

Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 340-343; see also
Robert Franklin, "Connecticut Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 1960s

6.

,

.

76.

Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 300-303; see also
Samuel Gove, "Illinois Reapportionment (1970)," Apportionment in the 1960s
,

.

77.

Illinois Const. Art. IV, Sec.

78.

Arizona Const. Art. IV, Pt.
Legislatures p. 41.

2,

3.

Sec.

1(1).

Zeller, American

,

79.

See Paul Kelso, "Arizona Reapportionment," Apportionment
Dixon, Democratic Representation p. 591;
in the 1960s
U.S.
29 L.Ed. 2d 352, 91
and Ely v. Klahr ,
S Ct. 1803 (1971)
;

,

,

.

80.

The Alaska Constitution [Art. VI, Sec. 3] referred only
to gubernatorial reapportionment of the house of representatives, senate representation having been specified
in the constitution; but other sections of Article VI
contemplated periodic revision of both senate and house
districts and the governor in 1965, recognizing implications of the 1964 reapportionment cases, assumed
responsibility to adjust senate representation. The Alaska
Supreme Court eventually sustained this assumption of
authority, against protest by some disadvantaged senators.
The effect of the reapportionment was to deprive the
constitutionally defined regions of their original
rationale in senate representation. See Arthur Peterson,
"Alaska Reapportionment: History and Analysis," ApporDixon, Democratic Representation
tionment in the 1960s
summarizes Alaska developments under the
pp. 369-370
All Power to the Governor."
"Big Daddy Syndrome:
heading:
.

,

,

81.

Arkansas Const. Art. Ill, Sec. 4. The 1874 Arkansas
Constitution [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] was amended in 1936 to
make the governor, secretary of state and attorney
general an ex officio board of apportionment.

82.

See Marcus Hoibrook, "Arkansas (1969) ," Apportionment in
the 19 60s Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 368-369,
;

,

592.
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.

.

83.

Zeller, American Legislatures p. 42, said in 1954 that
the Missouri arrangement was "widely acclaimed" and that
the senate reapportionment commission, combined with
house reapportionment by the secretary of state according
to constitutional formulas, meant "Missouri has recognized that reapportionment for both houses is a task that
lies outside the legislature itself."

84.

Missouri Const. Art. Ill, Sec.

85.

Dixon, Democratic
the fact that "in
datory bipartisan
never deadlocked
to this executive

86.

Missouri Const. Art. Ill, Sec.

87.

Missouri Const. Art. Ill, Sees. 2, 7; Missouri Statutes
Sec. 477.083 provides for designation of supreme court
commissioners. See Dixon, Democratic Representation
pp. 331-333, 611, for suggestion of the point about
deadlock; see also Robert Karsch, "Missouri Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 196Qs

>

7.

Representation pp. 331-332, credits
nominally bipartisan Missouri the mansenate apportionment commission has
[despite lack of a tie-breaking vote]"
discretion in the appointments.
,

2.

,

.

88.

no public officers
Michigan Const. [Art. IV, Sec. 6]
or employees may serve on the commission, and commissioners may not serve in the legislature until two years
after the apportionment in which they participated. Ellis
Waldron, "The Legislative Assembly in a Modern Montana
erroneously
Constitution, Montana Law Review 40 (1972)
stated that the Michigan commission elected a ninth
member as chairman.
;

,

89.

See Dixon, Democratic Representation , pp. 314-328, 608609; and Eldon Sneeringer, "Michigan Reapportionment,"
The U.S. Supreme Court
Apportionment in the 1960s
Badgley v. Hare 385 U.S. 114 (1966)] eventually declined
review of the state supreme court's choice made In Re
Apportionment of the Michigan Legislature 377 Mich. 396,
140 N.W.2d 436 (1966)
.

,

[

,

90.

Dixon, Democratic Representation , p. 328.

91.

New Jersey Const. Art. IV, Sec.

92.

See Ernest Reock, "New Jersey Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 1960s a computer employed to design
districts in 1969 made no effort to achieve compactness,
resulting in a wild pattern of boundary lines and "giving
the impression of an extreme case of gerrymandering."

3

(1)

,

(2)

;

93.

Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 336-340, 613-614;
Robert Dixon and Gordon Hatheway, "The Seminal Issue in State
Constitutional Revision: Reapportionment Method and Standards,"
William and Mary Law Review 10 (1969): 888, 890-893. Cited
hereafter as Dixon and Hatheway, William and Mary Law Review
,

10

(1969).
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.

94.

There is to be a reapporHawaii Const. Art. Ill, Sec. 4.
tionment in "1973 and every eighth year thereafter." See
Normal Meller, "Hawaii Reapportionment (1970)," Apportionment in the 1960s Dixon Democratic Representation , pp
599-600.
Burns v. Richardson 384 U.S. 73 (1966) was
of particular interest for its approval, on a temporary
basis and in the peculiar circumstances of Hawaii, of
reapportionment based upon registered voters rather than
total population. See also Dixon and H at hew ay William
888, 897-899.
and Mary Law Review 10 (1969)
;

,

,

,

,

:

95.

Pennsylvania Const. Art. II, Sec. 17. See Mitchell Hunt,
"Pennsylvania Reapportionment (1969)," Apportionment in
the 1960s and Dixon, Democratic Representation pp. 382,
620, for developments preceding adoption of the new commission plan; Dixon and Hatheway William and Mary Law
Review 10 (1969); 888, 895-896.
,

,

,

96.

Proposed New York Constitution of 1967, Art. Ill, Sec.
The draft article defined some standards to be ob2.
served by the commission, including a provision that
"Gerrymandering for any purpose is prohibited." The
latter provision almost predictably would precipitate
troublesome litigation, because any districting line
has political consequences that establish political
advantage for one group and disadvantage for another.
This provision would have invited the New York courts
to develop standards for measurement of gerrymandering,
a problem thus far largely evaded by the courts in
their reapportionment involvements. The suggestion
by Dixon Democratic Representation p. 339] that
judicial challenge to apportionment plans be required
to show "invidious political or racial effect" seems
a more workable approach to this problem.
,

[

97.

See William Boyd, "New York Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 1960s Dixon, Democratic Representation
pp. 360-361, 615-617; Dixon and Hatheway, William and
Boyd told
888, 896-897.
Mary Law Review 10 (1969):
Montana's legislative reapportionment committees in
February, 1971, that both major political parties in
New York retained full-time reapportionment experts.
,

;

98.

Proposed Maryland Constitution of 1968, Art. Ill, Sees.
3.05 and 3.06; 3.07 provided substantially the same
process for congressional districting.

99.

Dixon, Democratic Representation p. 382; Dixon and
888,
Hatheway, William and Mary Law Review 10 (1969)
893-895; see also Franklin Burdette, "Maryland Reapportionment," Apportionment in the 1960s
,

:

.

100.

Maryland Const. Art. Ill, Sec.
1970.
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5,

as amended, November,

.

.

.

41-44.

101.

Zeller, American Legislatures

102.

Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, ilawaii Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and draft constitutions
of New York (1967) and Maryland (1968)

,

pp.
,

.

103.

California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and New
Mexico (1969 draft)

104.

Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maryland (1968 draft) and New York (1967 draft)

105.

Connecticut, Illinois,

106.

Arizona's arrangement that the secretary of state apportion can be regarded as a simplified version of the Ohio
plan, and Alaska's provision for gubernatorial reapportionment also most closely resembles this group of agencies;
compare the 1970 Maryland provision for gubernatorial
reapportionment

107.

When Delegate Toole of Lewis and Clarke objected just before
the final vote in Montana's 1889 Convention that provisions
for senate representation were "a transfer of political
power in the Senate from a majority to a minority" promising
"taxation without representation in its most flagrant form,"
Delegate Goddard of Yellowstone moved the statement be
printed and "circulated as campaign literature."
(1889
Proceedings p. 944)

Ncv/

Mexico (1969 draft).

,

108.

Alaska [Art. II, Sec. 1: senate 20, house
Fixed size
senate 34, house 102];
40]; Arkansas [Art. Ill, Sec. 1:
senate 25, house 51];
Hawaii [Art. Ill, Sees. 2,3:
senate 59, house 177]; riichigan
Illinois [Art. IV, Sec. 1:
senate 38, house 110]; New York 1967
[Art. IV, Sees. 2, 3:
senate 60, house
draft constitution [Art. Ill, Sec. la:
150]; Rhode Island 1968 draft constitution [Art. IV, Sees.
senate 40, house 100].
3, 4:
:

Range of Size
Connecticut [Art. Ill, Sees. 3, 4: senate
10^50, house "125-225]
Florida [Art. Ill, Sees. 1, 16:
senate 30-40, house 80-100]; Virginia [Art. IV, Sees. 2, 3:
senate 33-40, house 90-100].
:

;

Maximum size
Maryland 1968 draft constitution, [Art. Ill,
Sec. 3:
senate 40, house 120]; New Mexico 1969 draft constitution [Art. Ill, Sec. 2: senate 42, house 70].
:

109.

Example:
a difference of 100 actual population between
two districts represents a variance of only 1 percent among
districts with average population of 10,000, but a variance
The variances
of 2 percent if the district norm is 5,000.
of as much as 10 percent in Montana's 1971 reapportionment
may prove comparatively large. Among twenty-nine states
-62-

.

.

v/hose 1971 reapportionments were

summarized in State Government News [(Lexington: The Council of State Governments,
Vol. 14, No. 12, December, 1971), p. 2], seven had kept
districts within less than 1 percent of variance.
110.

See Ellis Waldron, "The Legislative Assembly in a Modern
Montana Constitution," Montana Law Review 33 (1972) 1, 7
for these and other figures derived from data in 1970-71
Book of the States (Lexington: The Council of State
Governments, 1970), pp. 65, 82-83.

111.

Burns V. Richardson 834 U.S. 73, 85 (1966) is cited as
authority for this perhaps most restrictive base. A word
of caution may be in order that the reapportionment approved
in Burns was an interim plan allowed when legislative
elections were imminent.

112.

WMCA

,

v. Lomenzo , 238 Fed. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) affirmed
382 U.S. 4 (1965); and Baker v. Carr
247 Fed. Supp. 629
(N.D. Tenn. 1965)
,

113.

Dixon and Hatheway, William and Mary Law Review 10
(1969): 888-901.

114.

394 U.S.

115.

Wold

116.

Dixon and Hatheway, William and Mary Law Review 10

v.

(1969)

117.

:

526,

529

Anderson
888,

(1969).

noted above.

,

902.

By comparison with former language, this section (proposed
273) deleted obsolete and
in 1965 Laws of Montana , Ch
unconstitutional" requirements of one and only one senator
per county, permitted combination of counties in creating
legislative districts, deleted the earlier prohibition
against division of counties in districting (thereby permitting single-member districts) and anticipated a time
when federal constitutional requirements might permit return to the one-senator-per-county style of representation.
See Ellis Waldron, "Montana's 1966 Legislative Apportionment Amendment," xMontana Business Quarterly 4 (Spring, 1966)
11-12.
.

118.

Compact and contiguous: Alaska [Art. VI, Sec. 6]; Arkansas
[Art. Ill, Sec. 3]; Hawaii, [Art. Ill, Sec. 4]; Illinois
Pennsylvania
Michigan [Art. IV, Sec. 3]
[Art. IV, Sec. 3]
[Art. II, Sec. 16]; Virginia [Art. II, Sec. 6]; Idaho 1970
draft constitution [Art. Ill, Sec. 4]; New Mexico 1969
New York 1967 draft
draft constitution [Art. Ill, Sec. 5ci
constitution [Art. Ill, Sec. 2].
;

;

;

Compact: Maryland 1968 draft constitution [Art. Ill, Sec.
3.04]; Rhode Island 1968 draft constitution [Art. IV,
Sec.

5]
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:

.

Connecticut [Art. Ill, Sec. 3]; Florida [Art.

Contiguous
Ill, Sec.
119.

16]

Maryland 1968 draft constitution [Art. Ill, Sec. 3.04]:
"due regard to natural boundaries and boundaries of political subdivisions." New York 1967 draft constitution
"wherever practicable, preexisting
[Art. Ill, Sec. 2(c)]:
political subdivisions boundaries and natural geographic
boundaries shall be used as district boundaries." Rhode
"DisIsland 1968 draft constitution [Art. IV, Sec. 5]
tricts shall, as far as feasible, follow town and city
:

lines

"
.

2nd Extra Session, Ch

120.

1971 Laws of Montana

121.

Luce, Legislative Principles

122.

Compare Zeller, American Legislatures , p. 63 with Maurice
The Need for
Klain, "A New Look at the Constituencies:
American Political Science
a Recount and a Reappraisal,"
1105, 1111.
Review 49 (1955):

123.

Ibid

124.

William Keefe and Morris Ogul, The T^erican Legislative
Process: Congress and the States (Englev/ood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1964)
p. T2~, citing Paul David and Ralph
Eisenberg, State Legislative Districting (Chicago: Public
Administration Service, 1962), p. 20. Cited hereafter as
Keefe and Ogul, Legislative Process

.

,

pp.

,

p.

,

.

8.

380.

1107, 1108.

,

.

125.

See Waldron, "Legislative Assembly," p. 21 for computations
derived from 1970-1971 Book of the States (Lexington:
The Council of State Governments, 1970), pp. 82-83, and
comment on discussion of the matter in John Burns, The
Sometime Governments (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 82,

126.

See Malcolm Jewell, The State Legislature (New York:
Random House, 1969), pp. 20-24; Malcolm Jewell and Samuel
Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States
Random House, 1966)
Ch. 31 Keefe and Ogul,
(New York:
Legislative Process Ch. 3; Robert Dixon, "Representative
Values and Reapportionment Practice: The Eschatology of
'One-Man, One-Vote,'" Nomos X Yearbook of the American
Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (New York:
Atherton, 1968), pp. 167-195; Alfred DeGrazia, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York: Praeger,
Dixon, Democratic Representation Ruth Silva,
1962)
"Compared Values of the Smgle-and Multi-Member Legislative
District," Western Political Quarterly 17 (1964): 17;
David Leuthold, "The Effect of Multi-Member Districts on
State Legislatures" (processed, distributed in the 1965
Montana Legislature), Luce, Legislative Principles Ch 17;
,

,

,

;

;

,

-64-

.

.

;

—

John Banzhaf III, "Multimember Electoral Districts Do
They Violate the 'One Man, One Vote' Principle," Yale
1309.
Law Journal 7 5 (1966):
127.

The following discussion is derived directly from VJaldron,
"Legislative Assembly," pp. 23-24; there the author expressed a personal preference for single-member districts
or the limitation of multi-member districts to not more
than three members in the senate of a bicameral legislature.

128.

1971 Lav/s of Montana 2nd Extra Session, Ch. 8, Sec. 3
provides that 8 percent of the registered voters within
a multi-member district may petition for a special election; if a majority voting on the issue in that election
favors single-member districting the county commissioners
by majority vote shall divide the district into singlemember constituencies "as compact as possible, compris [ing]
contiguous territory ... as nearly equal as practicable
in population [with] boundaries [that] follow the census
enumeration division lines." It may be noted further
of this legislation that the same districtwide majority
favored by multi-member districting may tend to control
a majority of the county commissioners entrusted with
districting; the formulas "compact as possible" and
"equal as practicable" may invite unsettling litigation,
and the reference to "census enumeration division lines"
does not coincide with the terminology employed in the
United States census: does it refer to the basic "census
enumeration districts" or to their aggregations into
"census county divisions"?

129.

,

both chambers: California [Art. IV, Sec.
'Connecticut [Art. Ill, Sees. 3, 4]; Michigan [Art. IV,
Sees. 2, 3]; Missouri [Art. Ill, Sec. 9]; Pennsylvania
[Art. II, Sec. 16]; Maryland 1968 draft constitution [Art.
Ill, Sec. 3.03]; New York 1967 draft constitution [Art.

S ingle-member,
;
6]

Ill, Sec.

1]

Illinois [Art. IV, Sec. 2]:
Single- member, on e chaiTiber
sTnyle-membef districts for the senate, three representatives elected from each senate district.
:

Hawaii [Art. Ill, Sec.
Multi-member both chambers
Art. XVI]; Alaska [Art. XIV].
,

130

4

Jack Piano and Milton Greenberg, The Ameri can Political
Holt Rmehart Winston,
Dictionary, 2nd ed. (New York:
1967)

,

p.-

139.

•65-

and

